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SUMMARY 
 
Critical Issues in Privacy and Technology 
As access to information changes with increased use of technology, privacy 
becomes an increasingly prominent issue among technology users. Privacy concerns 
should be taken seriously because they influence system adoption, the way a system is 
used, and may even lead to system disuse. Threats to privacy are not only due to 
traditional security and privacy issues; human factors issues such as unintentional 
disclosure of information also influence the preservation of privacy in technology 
systems. 
Approach 
A dual-pronged approach was used to examine privacy. First, a broad 
investigation of younger and older adults’ privacy behaviors was conducted. This 
investigation resulted in a categorization of privacy behaviors associated with 
technology. There were three high level privacy behavior categories identified: 
avoidance, modification, and alleviatory behavior. This categorization furthers our 
understanding about the psychological underpinnings of privacy concerns and suggests 
that 1) common privacy feelings and behaviors exist across people and technologies and 
2) alternative designs which consider these commonalities may increase privacy. Second, 
I examined one specific human factors issue associated with privacy: disclosure error. 
This investigation focused on gaining an understanding of how to support privacy by 
preventing disclosure errors. Specifically, I explored instances where people made 
unintentional disclosures of private information when using technology. 
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Understanding Privacy Behaviors 
From a psychological perspective, an important preliminary step to designing for 
privacy is to understand the behaviors with which privacy is associated. As a way to 
understand privacy behaviors in this dissertation, an archival analysis of previously 
collected focus group data was conducted. The existing focus group data covered a wide 
range of privacy intensive topics including health information, location tracking, 
surveillance, and identity theft. The goal of this study was to gain a better understanding 
of privacy across technologies, to discover the similarities, and identify the differences in 
what privacy means across contexts as well as provide a means to evaluate current 
theories of privacy. 
Understanding Misclosure Occurrences 
One important behavior identified in the privacy literature, and evidenced in the 
archival analysis is that users manage privacy by withholding information from some 
people while wanting to share the same information with specific others. Thus, an 
important implication is that for technologies to effectively support privacy, they need to 
support specific disclosure and prevent disclosure errors, or what I have termed 
misclosure. A misclosure is an error in disclosure. When information is disclosed in error, 
or misclosed, privacy is violated in that information not intended for a specific person(s) 
is nevertheless revealed to that person. 
To understand the conditions under which misclosures are likely to occur I 
conducted a critical incident study. The critical incident technique is uniquely suitable to 
exploring misclosure because it allows the researcher to collect events of special 
significance (e.g., a misclosure incident) that have occurred in the past as well as explore 
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the conditions surrounding each disclosure or misclosure. The goal of this study was to 
provide a psychological basis for design suggestions for improving privacy in technology 
which was grounded in empirical findings. The study furthers our understanding about 
privacy errors in the following ways: First, it demonstrates for the first time that both 
younger and older adults experience misclosures relatively frequently. Second, it suggests 
that misclosures occur even when technology is very familiar to the user. Third, it 
revealed that some misclosure experiences result in negative consequences, suggesting 
misclosure is a potential threat to privacy. Finally, by exploring the context surrounding 
each reported misclosure, I was able to propose potential design suggestions that may 
decrease the likelihood of misclosure. 
Contributions 
To summarize, the contributions of this dissertation include: 
1. Identification and categorization of privacy behaviors across multiple technologies 
a. A critical examination of these behaviors resulting in suggestions for design 
improvements 
b. A discussion of the findings from this study in relation to existing theories of 
privacy 
2. Identification of the (system and psychological) conditions under which misclosures 
are likely to occur 
a. An in-depth examination of misclosure occurrences resulting in suggestions 
for designs which may prevent misclosures. 




Advances in computing and increasing use of technology may fundamentally 
change the conception of privacy because technology changes our ability to store, search, 
reproduce, and make information available to others (Sparck-Jones, 2003). While people 
were once able to easily determine who would have access to information about them, 
this is on longer the case. This fundamental change in the regulation of privacy threatens 
both users and businesses. For example, users report increased concerns about privacy 
(Karat, Karat, Brodie, & Feng, 2006; Sims Bainbridge, 2003; Westin, 2003) and 
increases in psychological and physiological stress due to these concerns (Webb, 1978). 
Businesses are affected by privacy because concerns about privacy influence system 
adoption (Herbsleb, Atkins, Boyer, Handel, & Finholt, 2002; Want, Hopper, Falc, & 
Gibbons, 1992) and trust of organizations (Karat, Karat & Brodie, 2008). Users cite 
privacy concerns as a reason they have not yet gone online, as well as a reason they have 
stopped using particular technologies (e.g., the internet; UCLA, 2003) altogether. When 
users are concerned about privacy, they may be less willing to use a technology; thus 
businesses developing those technologies suffer.  
Privacy and security fears are considered major barriers to continued growth of 
specific technologies (Hoffman, Novak, & Peralta, 1999; Metzger, 2004), perhaps 
because they are considered to be among the most serious concerns (O’Neil, 2001; 
specifically among internet users). For example in e-commerce settings, purchasers are 
more willing to do business with companies that are perceived to protect privacy (Tsai, 
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Egelman, Cranor, & Acquisti, 2007). Even when a user chooses to do business with a 
company, those consumers who are more concerned about privacy tend to want to limit 
access to their personal information (Phelps et al., 2000). When concerned about their 
privacy online, users may behave differently than they normally would. For example, 
they may become less likely to disclose information to websites, notify ISPs about 
unsolicited e-mail, request removal from mailing lists, respond angrily or 'flame' to 
unwanted email, and become less likely to use web sites that require registration 
(Sheehan & Hoy, 1999). Individuals are becoming more concerned about their privacy 
and are often taking action against what they perceive to be invasions of their privacy.     
Approaches to Preserving Privacy 
For the reasons outlined above, preserving privacy represents a major goal for 
information technology designers. However, protecting privacy is often a difficult 
challenge. From a technology perspective, protecting privacy is a multifaceted concept 
including physical security, internet security, software security, data handling, database 
design, policy, law, management, and human factors. Many approaches have proven 
successful in accomplishing specific sub-goals assumed to be required for protecting 
privacy. For example, information security has been improved, privacy policies have 
been re-written, the law is beginning to catch up with technology, and improved interface 
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Security Methods 
Security methods are methods that focus on ensuring that data are not 
compromised once they have been disclosed. These approaches vary in terms of method 
and include relatively simple strategies like password protection to more intensive 
strategies like data encryption and data obfuscation. Encryption protects already 
disclosed data by transforming it using an algorithm into a form that is not decipherable 
by those who do not have the encryption key, while data obfuscation modifies a dataset 
by substituting pieces of data with similar data from the same set (Bakken, 
Parameswaran, Blough, Palmer & Franz, 2004; Parameswaran & Blough, 2005). 
Although security methods are often effective ways of protecting private information 
once it has been disclosed to an intended recipient, it will not protect against a number of 
threats to privacy (e.g., unintentional disclosure; phishing, etc.). 
Legal & Policy Approaches 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no legal “right to privacy” mentioned 
in the bill of rights (Caudill & Murphy, 2000). Rather, Warren and Brandeis (1890), 
argued that individuals had a right “to be let alone” (p. 193), and that this right could be 
interpreted to mean that information collected about a person should be controlled by the 
individual. Thus, legal and policy approaches to preserving privacy typically focus on 
controlling how companies (and in some cases, governments) collect and disseminate 
personal information. In addition, some privacy policy (e.g., portions of informed 
consent) focuses on ensuring that users are aware of information being collected. The 
understanding of privacy used in these approaches is typically based on case law rather 
than psychological issues associated with privacy. 
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For example, users may consider information about them (e.g., social security 
number) to be “theirs”. From their perspective, they own it. However, third party 
information, or information that is collected about a person is not protected by the 4th 
Amendment (protection from unreasonable search and seizure). This means that 
information a bank, credit card company, or any other entity collects about a person is not 
necessarily legally protected, even though a person may “feel” as though they own the 
information because it is about them. Thus, legal approaches to privacy may not always 
reflect users understanding or attitudes about privacy. 
Human Computer Interaction Approaches 
Furthering an understanding of privacy is “central to the concerns of HCI (Human 
Computer Interaction)” (Karat, Karat, & Brodie, 2008, p. 646), thus HCI researchers have 
conducted investigations designed to contribute to our understanding about how to 
develop technologies that are privacy protective. From a design perspective, Palen and 
Dourish (2003), have argued that all designers of technology must consider users’ 
privacy at the beginning of the design process or risk that the system they develop will be 
privacy invasive. One method used at the beginning of the design process to understand 
the privacy issues involved in ubiquitous computing technologies is paratyping (Iachello, 
Truong, Abowd, Hayes & Stevens, 2006). Paratyping is a method of evaluation of a 
prototype of a specific technology set in a “real-world experience” (Iachello et al., 2006, 
p. 1011). In this method a researcher introduces a technological instance and then gathers 
participant feedback based on the interaction. In one study using paratyping, the authors 
concluded that algorithmic approaches (e.g., upfront privacy policy authoring) may not 
be a suitable approach to preserving privacy. Instead, they argue that gaining a better 
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understanding of the social dynamics of privacy would be a more useful approach in 
terms of interface design (Iachello et al., 2006). 
Reviewing the literature on social-psychological dynamics of privacy reveals two 
major theoretical treatments of privacy: Altman’s (1975) theory of interpersonal 
interaction and Westin’s (1967) theory of privacy and freedom.  
Theories of Privacy 
While both Altman’s (1975) theory of interpersonal interaction and Westin’s 
(1967) theory of privacy and freedom have “stood the test of time” and have “paved the 
way for others to follow” (Margulis, 2003), they are rarely referenced in HCI work on 
privacy (Caine, 2008; though see Palen and Dourish, 2003 for a notable exception). In the 
following sections I provide a brief overview of each theoretical approach and then 
explain how each approach can and cannot be applied to privacy in HCI. 
Westin’s Theory of Privacy and Freedom 
Westin (1967) views privacy as the control over when, how, and to what extent 
information about an individual is communicated to others. He identifies 4 privacy states: 
solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve, and 5 functions of privacy: personal 
autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and protected communication. 
Both classifications are supported by empirical studies. 
The Basis of Westin’s Theory 
Westin identifies a number of “general aspects of privacy which apply… in 
virtually every society” (p. 61). First, Westin notes that across cultures there is what he 
terms the “universal privacy invading principle,” that is, that there is a tendency for 
individuals to invade the privacy of others and for societies to want to know what is 
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going on for the purpose of guarding against anti-social activities. Westin argues that 
there are two processes at work that invade privacy in this way: individual curiosity and 
societal surveillance. Of individual curiosity he argues that it is not the nature of people 
to ‘let everyone alone’ or ‘mind their own business’, but rather that people across 
societies have an “insatiable” (p. 20) craving to discover secrets. Of surveillance by 
authorities, he argues that society has mechanisms, namely watching an individual’s 
conduct and judging it against societal norms to enforce society’s rules. Despite the 
opportunity for greater privacy provided by modern society, Westin notes that density, 
bureaucracy, and surveillance are threats to modern notions of privacy. 
Based on the analyses of privacy across cultures, Westin defines privacy as: “the 
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (pg. 7). This definition 
highlights the idea of control over information. It also alludes to the states of individual 
privacy Westin identifies. 
States of Individual Privacy 
Westin classifies privacy into 4 distinct states: solitude, intimacy, anonymity and 
reserve. Solitude is a state of physical withdrawal where an individual is separated from 
all other people and believes he or she is free from observation. In a state of solitude, 
although the individual is separated from other people there may be noise or other stimuli 
present in the environment. Intimacy is a state where an individual is secluded with at 
least one other person. This small unit, which may consist of more than a dyad, is 
separate from others. Anonymity is the state of being in public with the knowledge of 
being observed, but only by strangers and without the risk of recognition. Importantly, 
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Westin includes in his description of anonymity that the individual is free from 
identification and surveillance. By this description a member of a crowd in London, 
where video surveillance is ubiquitous, is NOT experiencing anonymity, even if they are 
surrounded by strangers. Westin states: “Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic 
observation in public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek 
in open spaces and public arenas” (pg. 31). The state of anonymity also includes 
publication of ideas anonymously. Finally, reserve is a psychological barrier where a 
person holds back some expression. Westin claims that reserve “expresses the 
individual’s choice to withhold or disclose information” (p. 32) and that the state of 
reserve varies culture to culture. 
Despite the intuitive sense Westin’s classification of privacy states may make, 
Westin’s states were developed ad hoc (Pedersen, 1979). To evaluate the appropriateness 
of Westin’s classification, Pedersen conducted a factor analytic study to determine types 
of privacy. This factor analysis confirmed Westin’s hypothesized states, with slight 
modification. Intimacy was identified to have two separate types: intimacy with friends 
and intimacy with family, and solitude was deconstructed into solitude and isolation. 
Pedersen’s description of the 6 resultant states differs slightly from Westin’s. For 
example, the description Pedersen offers of reserve, “unwillingness to be with and talk 
with others, especially strangers” differs from Westin’s definition of reserve as, “a 
psychological barrier where a person holds back some expression” and “expresses the 
individual’s choice to withhold or disclose some information.”   
Marshall (1974), independent of Westin and Pedersen, also conducted a factor 
analytic study of privacy states. Marshall classified six factors indicating six independent 
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privacy states: intimacy, not neighboring, seclusion, solitude, anonymity, and low self-
disclosure. Despite minor differences each classification arrives at similar conclusions 
that some states occur while alone, while others occur with people, and others indicate 
regulation of behavior such as disclosure.  
Functions of Individual Privacy 
In addition to identifying states of privacy, Westin also attempts a classification of 
the functions of individual privacy. According to Westin these are: personal autonomy, 
emotional release, self-evaluation and limited and protected communication. Personal 
autonomy is the “desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly by others” (p. 
33). Emotional release functions to provide relaxation from the various roles people play. 
Westin claims that people need moments off stage when they may “deviate temporarily 
from social etiquette”, take “respite from emotional stimulation of daily life” (p. 35). 
Specifically, this function provides “protection [from]… minor non-compliance with 
social norms” (p. 35) and allows people to not be held responsible for venting to family 
or friendship circles. This function is similar to the idea of presentation of self, where 
different versions of the self are compared to actors on a stage; the self that is being 
portrayed at a moment is the actor on stage (Goffman, 1959). 
 Self-evaluation is the opportunity to integrate “experiences into meaningful 
patterns”, to plan, and to process. Westin claims that “individuals need to process the 
information that is constantly bombarding them, information that cannot be processed 
while they are still ‘on the go’” (p. 36). Self-evaluation also allows the opportunity to 
create and to evaluate the timing of making information known to the public. Finally, 
limited and protected communication involves choosing what to disclose to whom. This 
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includes the idea of sharing information with certain people under the expectation that the 
information will not be repeated to others.  
Similar to the privacy states, Westin proposes his classification of functions of 
privacy based on his understanding of the anthropological and sociological literatures but 
does not offer additional evidence that might test these claims. As with the privacy states, 
Pedersen (1997) followed up on Westin’s ad hoc classification of privacy functions using 
a factor analysis. He identified 5 privacy needs/functions/purposes: contemplation, 
autonomy, rejuvenation, confiding and creativity. There is some overlap between 
Westin’s classification of functions of privacy and Pedersen’s, however, the overlap is 
not complete. Overall, Pedersen’s (1979; 1982; 1997; 1999) work extends and 
empirically validates categories and relationships proposed by Westin (1967). However, 
all of Pedersen’s work assumes Altman’s theoretical stance (Pedersen, 1999), which we 
turn to next.  
Altman’s Theory of Social Interaction 
Altman views privacy as an interpersonal boundary process by which people 
regulate (control) interactions with others. Using mechanisms including personal space 
and territoriality, individuals regulate toward a match between a desired and achieved 
level of privacy. When achieved privacy equals desired privacy, optimal privacy occurs. 
However, when a congruent state is impossible to reach, coping and/or negative 
consequences are hypothesized to occur. 
Background 
In addition to drawing on the work of numerous anthropologists and sociologists 
Altman (1975), also draws on Westin’s (1967) work, recognizing and restating Westin’s 
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classification of four types of privacy: solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve and 
four functions of privacy: personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and 
limited and protected communication. Beyond recognition and unelaborated description, 
Altman does not offer a critique or extension of Westin’s categories. Rather, it appears 
that Altman accepts the categorizations, but does not find them of use. Instead, Altman 
(1975, p. 12) claims the functions of privacy are, “(a) control and management of 
interpersonal interaction, (b) plans, roles, and strategies for dealing with others, and (c) 
features of self-identity” (cf., Pedersen, 1997; Westin, 1967). 
Overview of Theory 
Altman’s is essentially a theory about environment and behavior, specifically, 
social behavior and its relation to the physical environment. His theory is broad enough 
to be considered a theory of social interaction (Margulis, 2003) rather than merely a 
theory of privacy and includes conceptualizations of privacy, crowding, territory, and 
personal space. He examines, “how people are affected by the physical environment in 
face-to-face interaction and how they actively use the environment to shape social 
interaction with others” (Altman, 1975, pgs. 2-3). Altman views the physical 
environment as a behavioral extension of the self, thus components in the environment 
are considered parts of the theory, in the same way as psychological components. 
For Altman (1975), privacy is central to the other concepts he discusses (i.e., 
crowding, territoriality, and personal space). He proposes that privacy is, “a central 
regulatory process by which a person (or group) makes himself more or less accessible 
and open to others and that the concepts of personal space and territorial behavior are 
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mechanisms that are set in motion to achieve desired levels of privacy” (Altman, 1975, p. 
3). This definition emphasizes privacy as control over interaction. 
Conceptualization of Privacy 
Privacy, to Altman, is a process. He describes a hypothetical personal boundary 
that may be more open—where it is more receptive to interaction with others—or more 
closed where the “self” is less open to interaction. Altman argues that this regulation is 
dynamic, meaning an individual, influenced by changing conditions, opens or closes 
themselves to others resulting in a desired level of interaction. Privacy is considered an 
optimizing process where people seek to interact not too much or too little, but at an 
optimal level. Both inputs (incoming stimuli from others) and outputs (disclosing) are 
regarded as being involved in privacy regulation. Altman, Vinsel, & Brown (1981) 
hypothesize that a period of openness will eventually be followed by a period of 
closedness. Relationships may move toward closedness or openness as time progresses 
(see pg. 144). 
Selective control 
Selective control is the idea that people regulate their interaction by making 
themselves more or less accessible to others. Ideas of openness and closedness, 
availability and unavailability, passable and not passable, and where a person falls at a 
certain time on these are all dependent on unmentioned circumstances. 
Because of the dynamic nature of Atlman’s conceptualization of privacy, the 
desired level of privacy (contact with others at a particular moment) may not equal the 
level of achieved privacy. The desired level of privacy is, “an internal, personal state in 
which a person or group develops momentary desires for certain levels of input and 
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output to and from others” (Altman, 1975, pg, 6). Although the theory does not explain 
when desired levels of interaction might be high or low, it allows for the full range of 
preferred interaction levels. Altman states that this interaction level may shift over time. 
When there is a mismatch between desired privacy and achieved privacy a person or 
group will adjust by altering interpersonal control mechanisms until the achieved level of 
privacy equals the desired level of privacy. It is hypothesized that people engage in 
privacy regulation to ensure that achieved privacy equals desired privacy. These privacy-
regulation mechanisms include personal space, territory, verbal behavior and nonverbal 
behavior. 
Mechanisms for the Regulation of Privacy 
If a person recognizes that they have less privacy than they want, they may 
engage in behaviors designed to lessen their interaction; alternatively, if a person 
recognizes they have more privacy than they want, they may engage in behaviors to 
increase their interaction. To describe this notion, Altman introduces the ideas 
“interpersonal control” and “interpersonal boundary regulation,” both of which refer to 
the notion of a person “maintaining an appropriate and desired level of interaction 
between itself and the external physical and social environment,” (Altman, 1975, pgs. 3- 
4). To maintain the appropriate level of interaction, people regulate privacy to a desired 
level by using behavioral mechanisms. Behavioral mechanisms (see Table 1) used to 
achieve privacy goals include verbal behavior, paraverbal behavior, nonverbal behavior, 
personal space, territoriality and culture (Altman & Chemers, 1980; Altman, 1975). 
Behavioral mechanisms that are used to regulate privacy include increasing 
physical distance from another person and communicating, verbally or non-verbally,  
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Verbal the contents of what a 
person says 
Saying: 
 “Let’s talk” 
 “Can I raise an issue with you” 
 “Sorry, I’m too busy now” 
 “No, I can’t make it this evening” 
Para Verbal way of speaking, how 
someone says something 
Speaking in a cool or warm tone 
Non Verbal communication without 
words including posture, 
gaze, facial expressions and 
gestures 
 body orientation 




 looking away 
 fidgeting with own clothing 
 rubbing own hands together 
 looking at our watches 
 assuming rigid, symmetrical body 
positions 
Personal Space "the space within an 
invisible boundary around 
people that is with them 
everywhere they go." 
(Altman & Chemers, 1980, 
p. 102) 
 increase or decrease physical distance 
between self and another person 
o by backing away 
o by moving closer 
 
Territory control and ownership of a 
place by a person or group 
 invite someone into a territory they 
occupy 
 closing a door 
 use signs saying keep out or welcome 
 offering a chair 
 providing refreshments 
 not inviting in 
Culture customs, rules and norms 
which communicate 
availability to other 
members in the same culture 
 not dropping by a friend’s house at dinner 
time 
 too early in the morning or too late at 
night avoiding 
 coming to parties too early and leaving at 
a reasonable hour 
 not opening shut doors (at least without 
knocking) etc.)               
(Altman & Chemers, 1980; Altman, 1975) 
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dissatisfaction with the level of interaction, among many others. All behavioral 
mechanisms incur some cost (expending physical and/or psychological energy) to the 
person or group who is engaging in them. Altman claims that “after repeated failures to 
achieve a balance between achieved and desired levels of privacy, a person may accept 
the fact of inevitable and uncontrolled intrusion and/or separation.” Accepting an 
inevitable and uncontrolled intrusion is hypothesized to have detrimental consequences: 
“psychological viability or well-being of people and groups centers on the successful 
management of privacy. That is, success or failure at privacy regulation may well have 
implications for self-identity, self-esteem, and self-worth – or the very well-being and 
survival capability of people and groups” (pg. 81, Altman & Chemers). 
Comparison of Theories of Privacy  
In the preceding sections, two theories of privacy were reviewed. Both theories 
posited that privacy is about controlling interaction and information disclosure. The first, 
Westin’s theory, views privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.” The second, Altman’s theory, postulates that privacy is a 
boundary regulation process. A fundamental difference between Westin’s and Altman’s 
views of privacy is definitional. Whereas Westin’s concept of privacy focuses on control 
over information, Altman’s concept of privacy focuses on regulation of interaction.  
An additional distinction is that for Westin, privacy is related to withdrawal, 
whereas for Altman privacy includes the spectrum of interaction (from closedness to 
openness). Repeatedly in his writing, Westin pits social 
stimulation/interaction/communication against privacy: “social stimulation… exists… 
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alongside… needs for privacy.” (pg 10), but is not a part of privacy. On the other hand, 
for Altman, the need for stimulation is also a privacy need; states of too little interaction 
are considered cases where achieved privacy is more than desired privacy. Most studies 
of privacy in HCI discuss privacy in the way Westin approaches privacy, as a state of 
isolation, rather than as one of various states of interaction. 
A strength of Westin’s theory is that the states and functions proposed are clear 
and well defined; hypotheses are easily drawn from these classifications. For example, 
when privacy is violated we may expect autonomy or creativity to decrease. Similarly, 
Altman offers hypotheses about what happens if achieved privacy does not equal desired 
privacy: behavioral mechanisms will be engaged until optimal privacy is achieved. 
However, Altman’s theory does not offer predictions about when privacy may be desired, 
or why.  
Both Westin and Altman’s theoretical approaches are useful in furthering our 
understanding of privacy in HCI. Because Westin’s theory focuses on control over 
information, his theory may be particularly useful in assessing information privacy (i.e., 
data privacy). On the other hand, Altman’s theory focuses on regulation of interaction 
and may therefore be suited for understanding privacy of systems that allow/encourage 
online interaction (e.g., online communities).   
However, despite the potential usefulness of these theories in HCI a number of 
problems plague their adoption as principles that may be used to guide further research. 
First, the field has yet to agree on a singular or multi-themed definition of privacy (Leino-
Kilpi et al., 2001; Caine, 2008). This lack of an agreed upon definition has left privacy as, 
“a concept disarray” (Solove, 2006), with multiple papers on privacy introducing the 
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topic of their paper by saying, “the concept [of privacy] and its definition often remain 
ambiguous,” (Acquisti, Friedman, & Telang, 2006). Second, neither theory addresses the 
use of technology; there is a need to evaluate each theory against current research that 
explores privacy and technology. Finally, designers find it difficult to apply either 
theoretical approach in their work with technology: “It is by no means an easy task to 
apply Altman’s theory of privacy to the problem of designing a privacy-supporting video 
media space... Altman’s theory largely ignores the privacy-technology relationship…. 
Altman’s description of the process is extremely abstract: both the boundaries and the 
mechanisms by which they are controlled are purposefully left ambiguous,” (Boyle, 
2005, p. 152). Therefore, for current theories of privacy to be useful in HCI they need to 
be evaluated and clarified. 
Interim Summary: Need for Study 1 
To summarize, despite various approaches, privacy continues to be a major 
concern among technology users (Karat, Karat, Brodie, & Feng, 2006; Sims Bainbridge, 
2003; Westin, 2003). Users “flame, complain and abstain” (Sheehan & Hoy, 1999) when 
technology does not appropriately protect privacy, make their dissatisfaction known 
publicly, and even refuse to begin using new technologies because of privacy concerns 
(Herbsleb, Atkins, Boyer, Handel, & Finholt, 2002; Want, Hopper, Falc, & Gibbons, 
1992). Current theories of privacy are ill-equipped to provide guidance about privacy as it 
relates to technology. Therefore, what is left to understand is the nature of privacy 
concerns, how they influence behavior, and how we can provide technology solutions to 
allay such concerns. Gaining this broad understanding is the first goal of the proposed 
research and will be addressed in Study 1, an archival analysis.  
 30   
From a psychological perspective, an important preliminary step to designing for 
privacy is to understand the feelings and behaviors with which privacy is associated. As a 
first step toward understanding privacy feelings and behaviors, an archival analysis of a 
set of transcripts obtained from multiple focus groups was conducted. The scenarios in 
the focus covered a wide range of privacy intensive topics, including health information, 
location tracking, surveillance, and identity theft thus providing a rich data set from 
which to obtain reports of feelings and behaviors associated with privacy across 
technologies. In the next section I provide a more focused introduction to a specific 
problem in privacy in HCI: supporting privacy by preventing disclosure errors. 
Privacy in Human-Computer Interaction 
Although widely considered an important topic in psychology, privacy has 
received little scholarly attention in the psychological literature (Altman, 1975; 
Berscheid, 1977; Iachello & Abowd, 2005; J. Karat, Karat, & Brodie, 2008; Ludford, 
Priedhorsky, Reily, & Terveen, 2007; Margulis, 2003; Palen & Dourish, 2003; Patil & 
Lai, 2005; Webb, 1978; Westin, 1967, 2003). However, research on privacy is flourishing 
is the field of HCI. HCI designers have realized that the systems they are currently 
developing may threaten the privacy of their users if privacy is not taken into account at 
the beginning of the design process (Palen & Dourish, 2003). 
Within the HCI literature most research has been atheoretical, centering around 
groupings of technologies and features, rather than fundamental psychological aspects of 
privacy. Two features that have received attention are: information type and information 
receiver. 
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Information Type 
Different pieces of information have different levels of overall “privateness” 
(Metzger, 2004) or sensitivity (Hawkey & Inkpen, 2006). Privateness ranges from “very 
private” to “not really private,” while sensitivity is associated with willingness to disclose 
such that individuals are less willing to disclose sensitive than non-sensitive information 
(Singer, von Thurn, & Miller, 1995). For example, location has been found to be a 
particularly sensitive piece of information (Kaasinen, 2005; Patil & Lai, 2005) that users 
are often unwilling to disclose. In other studies participants reported preferring to keep 
early work drafts, phone numbers, personal statistics (e.g., SSN, marital status, salary), 
history of performance reviews, and health related information out of the hands of others 
(Olson, Grudin & Horvitz, 2005). 
It may be that the possession of a piece of information by another leaves the 
discloser vulnerable to the power of others, thereby increasing the degree of risk of 
disclosure (Burgoon, 1982). Specifically, stigmas which refer to “a stable characteristic 
or attribute of an individual that is perceived as damaging to the individual’s reputation” 
(Montgomery & Baxter, pg. 13) increase the risk of disclosure. Stigmas include 
information items such as physical disability, homosexuality, sexual abuse, drug 
addiction, alcoholism, and diseases such as mental illness, epilepsy and HIV-positive 
status. Individuals tend to be stigmatized when they posses or display characteristics of a 
stigma, or are associated with someone who is stigmatized. Importantly, stigmas tend to 
continue to be associated with a person over time so those who have in the past been 
stigmatized, tend to continue to be stigmatized. 
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    Table 2. Information Privatness by Type 





Favorite TV show 
Favorite snack food 







Number of people in household 
Political party affiliation 







Drafts of work projects 
Salary 
Child’s name 
Credit card number 
Banking information 
Social security number 
Location 
Note. Adapted from Metzger (2004) with additional data from Ludford, 
Priedhorsky, Reily, & Terveen, 2007; Olson, Grudin & Horvitz (2005); Hawkey 
& Inkpen, (2006); Ackerman, Cranor & Reagle (1999)
More Private 
Less Private 
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Although no one study has compared all types of information, Table 2 presents a 
conceptual summary compiled from multiple studies of types of information by level of 
general privateness. While the simplicity and potential usefulness of this table is 
appealing, it should be viewed with a cautious eye; it is likely that type of information in 
isolation is poor predictor of privacy preference. 
Information Receiver 
In addition to type of information, perceived privacy of a request is also 
dependent on the relationship of the information discloser to receiver (Adams, 1999; 
Consolvo et al., 2005; Hawkey & Inkpen, 2005; Khalil & Connelly, 2006; Lederer, 
Mankoff, & Dey, 2003; Muller, Smith, Shoher, & Goldberg, 1991; Olson, Grudin, & 
Horvitz, 2005; Patil & Lai, 2005). Although across studies different groups were 
identified (e.g. colleagues, family, friends, etc.), the common finding across groups was 
that participants perceived different levels of privacy for different groups (whether these 
be self-defined or researcher imposed). Overall, the supervisor/manager/boss was 
associated with the most privacy concern while the spouse/ significant other was 
associated with the least (Consolvo et al., 2005; Hawkey & Inkpen, 2005; Lederer et al., 
2003). 
Information Type by Information Receiver 
Although there may be types of information and certain receivers that influence 
perceived privacy independently, many studies reveal a more complex information type 
by information receiver interaction (see Figure 1). That is, neither the type of 
information, nor the information receiver alone predicts the level of perceived privacy of 
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an event. Rather, it is both of these variables in combination that predict the perceived 
privacy of an event. For example, a high privacy information type (e.g. location 
information) may not be considered highly private when the information receiver is a 
spouse or significant other. However, if the information receiver is a stranger then 
location information will be considered highly private (e.g., Khalil & Connelly, 2006). 
  
Figure 1. Information Type by Information Receiver Interaction 
 
In studies where both variables have been examined in combination, the 
relationship of perceived privacy (often operationalized as privacy comfort level or 
sharing preference) differed based on both information type and information receiver. For 
instance, in a study of web browser use, privacy comfort level was influenced by a 
combination of viewer (information receiver) and sensitivity of content (information 
type; Hawkey & Inkpen, 2006). Similarly, for a project management groupware system, 
users who engaged in participatory design wanted to restrict sharing different aspects of 
projects with a variety of potential information receivers (Mueller, Smith, Shoher & 
Goldberg, 1991). 
Even when studied in combination the patterns of privacy preferences are not 
simple: some information types are variable across people in terms of sharing preferences 
while others are consistent. For example, while some participants are willing to share 
personal items with co-workers, others are less willing to do so. Items that tend to be less 
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variable across people include a general preference for sharing work email address and 
work phone number with co-workers, and never giving credit card information to the 
public (Olsen et. al, 2005). However, it may not be that both information type and 
receiver variables are equally important; the identity of the inquirer has been shown to be 
a stronger determinant of information disclosure than the situation (Leaderer, Mankoff & 
Dey, 2003). 
If these variables truly interact then it may not be appropriate to examine either in 
isolation as the results may appear contradictory, leading to the conclusion that “privacy 
means different things to different people” (Karat, Karat & Brodie, 2008, p. 642). To 
appropriately assess which types of information people consider the most private we need 
to specify an intended recipient or else risk that each participant imagines a different 
potential receiver of such information. It is likely that participants would perceive an 
invasion of privacy if we ask about giving out SSN, credit card information and birth date 
to “the public”. However, if we specify “your credit card company” as the receiver of 
such information, participants are less likely to claim an invasion of privacy.  
In summary, what is clear from these studies is that users have specific and 
complex privacy and disclosure preferences. One way to support privacy in these systems 
therefore, is to ensure that no errors of disclosure occur. 
Introducing Misclosure 
One clear result that can be gleaned from the review of findings from studies of 
privacy in HCI presented above is that an important aspect of preserving privacy is the 
ability to withhold information from some people while sharing with specific others. 
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Thus, for technologies to effectively support privacy, they need to support specific 
disclosure and prevent disclosure errors.     
A wide variety of computer mediated systems ranging from cell phones to online 
health communities are used by millions of people each day. Despite the frequency with 
which many people uses these technologies, people tend to lack awareness of what 
information they disclose to online systems (Ahern, Eckles, Good, King, Naaman, & 
Nair, 2007) and therefore may be disclosing information in error. Though research in 
human factors has a comprehensive theory of human error (e.g., Reason, 1984), this 
theory has received little attention in the context of privacy in HCI.  
In psychological terms, a disclosure can be defined as “the act of revealing 
personal information to others” (Jourard, 1971, p. 2). A counterpart to the intentional act 
of disclosure is the act of revealing information in error. When information is disclosed in 
error, or a misclosure occurs, privacy is violated in that information not intended for a 
specific person(s) is nevertheless revealed to that person. 
Misclosures can occur in multiple ways (See Table 3 for types of misclosure). For 
example, an individual may disclose intended information to unintended recipients by 
accident. This type of misclosure is labeled as a recipient misclosure. An information 
misclosure is when an individual discloses unintended information to the intended 
recipient. A final type of misclosure, a combination misclosure, is when an individual 
discloses unintended information to an unintended recipient. Each type of misclosure 
may be related to different psychological variables. To explore the type of variables 
associated with each type of misclosure a critical incident study was used in this 
dissertation.  
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Designing for privacy does not mean keeping all information away from 
everyone. Rather, in most cases privacy means keeping some information away from 
some people. When people choose to disclose private information through technology 
systems, they engage in behaviors to attempt to ensure two things: 1) that the information 
reaches only those for whom it was intended, and 2) that the information remains hidden 
from any others. However, because of errors in disclosure, this is often difficult to 
accomplish. 
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Table 4 provides a summary of three types of disclosure errors, as well as an 
example of each. Phishing is an example of a recipient misclosure because the user sends 
the intended information (e.g., password to bank account) to an unintended person 
(phisher instead of the bank). In this case the misclosure occurred for two reasons a) 
because the phisher is stealing information and b) because the technology did not provide 
enough information to the user to become aware that the recipient of the information 
would be the phisher and not the bank. An example of an information misclosure is an 
event where a user attaches a photo of themselves on the beach to their boss, rather than a 
photo of them standing dutifully by their conference poster. In this case, the user intended 
(and was successful) in sending information to the boss, however, the information was 
not the information the user meant to send. In the final case, the user commits a 
combination misclosure. An example of this mistake which combines a recipient 
misclosure and an information misclosure is when a user forwards an email to a listserv 
when they actually meant to delete that email. 
While the examples presented above are only for the sake of explanation, in the 
next section I present an actual case study of a misclosure incident. 
Misclosure Case Study 
Reiko Ohnuma, PhD is a professor of Religion at Dartmouth College. She is the 
author of both journal articles and a book and teaches classes regularly as part of her 
professorship. Dr. Ohnuma began using facebook; she set up her profile, uploaded a 
profile photo, and set her privacy settings so that only her friends (i.e., people she 
specifically approved) could see most information about her, including her status updates. 
She also joined the Dartmouth network. 
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Reiko virtually interacted with her friends on facebook, making regular status 
updates. Sometimes Reiko would vent about her duties as professor. For example, on 
November 3rd, Reiko posted a status update that read, “Reiko has nothing interesting to 
say about these damn papers, but better think of something quick,” apparently referring to 
papers she had to grade for a class she was teaching. It is likely that Reiko did not want 
students in her class to know she had nothing interesting to say about the papers the 
students wrote. 
Sometimes Reiko’s friends would respond to her status updates with helpful 
information, a joke, or a comforting remark. For example, on November 17th, while 
preparing to give a lecture the following morning, Reiko complained that she, “doesn’t 
know how to explain what ‘modernity’ is & isn’t entirely clear herself.” A helpful 
colleague offered his take on modernity, to which Reiko replied that she would, 
“shamelessly plagiarize” the language the colleague used in his description in her class. 
After teaching the class on modernity, Reiko posted another status update: “Reiko 
pulled it off with aplomb,” referring to her successful lecture. The colleague who offered 
his take on modernity congratulated Reiko on the social networking site. Reiko then 
replied, “yeah, but i feel like such a fraud…do you think dartmouth parents would be 
upset about paying $40,000 a year for their children to go here if they knew that certain 
professors were looking up stuff on Wikipedia and asking for advice from their facebook 
friends on the night before the lecture?” (see Figure 2 for screen shot of the 
conversation). 
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Figure 2. Conversation Available to all Dartmouth facebook Users 
   
Obviously Reiko did not understand that other people besides her facebook 
friends would be able to see her status updates. Specifically, I assume she did not expect 
her students, many of whom are members of the Dartmouth facebook network (anyone 
with an @dartmouth.edu email address can join the Dartmouth network), to be able to see 
her status updates. The problem is that Reiko’s understanding of the privacy settings on 
facebook did not match with the way the system functions. By joining the Dartmouth 
network, Reiko made her profile information and status updates available to all other 
Dartmouth network members, even though she thought she set her privacy settings so that 
only her “friends” could see this information. 
In this case, no amount of additional security, encryption, or policy would have 
protected Reiko’s privacy. The problem was with an interface that did not support Reiko 
being able to disclose information to those she wanted to disclose to while keeping the 
same information from others. Thus, Reiko misclosed. 
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Critical Issues 
While a privacy error on facebook such as the one committed by Reiko might be 
viewed by many as merely a social blunder (perhaps even humorous), few would argue 
that committing a similar mistake when using a Personal Health Record (PHR), for 
example is a laughing matter. Privacy of health information is a major concern among 
designers, patients, and health care providers (Thede, 2008). Besides increasing concerns 
about using potentially beneficial technologies such as PHRs, a misclosure of health 
information could have even more far reaching consequences. Consider a recipient 
misclosure incident where a patient accidentally disclosed his or her cancer diagnosis to 
their employer instead of to their general practitioner. In the best case, the patient might 
get sympathy earlier than expected, but in the worse case an employer might look the 
person over for a promotion, or even fail to renew a contract if the person is not a salaried 
employ.   
Interim Summary: Need for Study 2 
Many technical solutions have been developed that address issues of privacy and 
security of already disclosed information. However, disclosure errors are as threatening 
as data breeches and lapses in internet security, yet no research has addressed the human 
factors issues associated with this threat to privacy. A misclosure is the act of 
unintentionally revealing information when using technology. This type of error can have 
serious consequences on privacy. There is a need to understand the types of misclosures 




 42   
Summary & Overview of Studies 
From this review of human factors issues associated with privacy in HCI, two 
things become clear. First, there is a need for a better understanding of the variety of 
behaviors associated with privacy and technology. Second, there is a need to support 
users in the specific goal of keeping certain information from certain people, as this one 
of the human factors issues associated with preserving privacy. 
In this dissertation I examined privacy from two complementary perspectives to 
better understand why privacy issues remain a barrier in the design and use of 
technology. The objectives of studies were to identify, categorize and critically examine 
privacy behaviors across multiple technologies and determine which were related to 
design factors, and uncover the system and psychological conditions under which 
misclosures were likely to occur. Results from the studies in combination provide a broad 
understanding of many of the privacy issues facing technology users, as well as an in-
depth exploration of one threat to privacy: disclosure error. 
Study 1 was an archival analysis of existing focus group data about younger and 
older adults’ privacy-related behaviors. The primary goal of this study was to identify and 
categorize privacy behaviors that are associated with technology use. 
Study 2 was a critical incident investigation of disclosure errors among younger 
and older adults. The goal of this study was to understand the factors that surround 
misclosure incidents. Specifically, this investigation explored system and psychological 
characteristics that led to misclosure incidents as well as examined consequences of those 
misclosures. The knowledge gained provides a psychological basis for design suggestions 
grounded in empirical findings (e.g., suggestions for technology instruments to avoid 
misclosures). 
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To summarize, the contributions of this dissertation include: 
1. Identification and categorization of privacy behaviors across multiple technologies 
a. A critical examination of these behaviors resulting in suggestions for design 
improvements 
b. A discussion of the findings from this study in relation to existing theories of 
privacy 
2. Identification of the (system and psychological) conditions under which misclosures 
are likely to occur 
a. An in-depth examination of misclosure occurrences resulting in suggestions 
for designs which may prevent misclosures. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD FOR STUDY 1: ANALYSIS OF FOCUS GROUP DATA 
The academic study of privacy has a relatively short history, and there is 
agreement that relatively little is known about the topic (e.g., Altman, 1975; Berscheid, 
1977; Iachello & Abowd, 2005; Karat, Karat, & Brodie, 2008). Specifically, there is a 
lack of understanding of the psychological variables related to privacy (Caine, 2008). 
From a psychological perspective, an important preliminary step to further study is to 
understand the behaviors with which privacy is associated.  
In this study I attempted to gain a better understanding of privacy behaviors 
across a broad range of interactions and technologies. A goal of this study was to identify 
reported privacy behaviors across multiple technologies. Specifically, I gathered privacy 
related experiences from a range of participants by conducting an archival analysis of 
previously collected focus group data. 
Choosing a focus group as a research method can be justified at many points 
throughout the examination of a particular research question (Stewart & Shamdasani, 
1990). For example, focus groups may be useful after an experimental study to help 
explain seemingly confusing quantitative findings. However, focus group methodology 
may be particularly useful in the exploratory phase of research because of the flexibility 
of the method and the opportunity to obtain data in the participant’s own words (Stewart 
& Shamdasani, 1990). One of the goals of this study was to understand users’ 
conceptions of privacy, thus a focus group method was particularly useful in this 
exploratory phase of research on privacy.  
This type of data provides a basis of understanding about “everyday privacy 
behaviors” as described by participants. Once we better understand the types of behaviors 
people engage in with respect to privacy, we can explore the behaviors more deeply. 
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Specifically, we are now able to better understand what behaviors participants report and 
how they describe privacy related behaviors.  
 The focus groups described in this section were conducted during the Fall of 2007 
and Spring of 2008 as part of Michelle Kwasny’s MSHCI project. Thus, this chapter is 
separated into 2 major sections: a section that explains how data were collected 
(including participants, materials, and procedure) and a section that describes the method 
for analyzing the 500+ pages of data that were generated from the focus groups.  
Participants 
Participants were 34 older adults (20 female) between the ages of 60 and 80 (M = 
69.45, SD = 4.95) and 26 younger adults (13 female) between the ages of 18 and 26 (M = 
20.88, SD = 2.03). Older adult participants were recruited from a database of people that 
had previously expressed interest in participating in studies in the Human Factors and 
Aging Lab and from a local senior center (Maggie Russell Tower). Younger adult 
participants were drawn from the student participant pool at Georgia Tech. 
As shown in Table 5, participants were well educated and diverse in terms of 
ethnicity. Participants were fluent English speakers. Younger adults received class credit 
for participation whereas older adult participants were remunerated for their time at a rate 
of $10 per hour. Approval for the study was given by the Georgia Institute of Technology 
Institutional Review Board.  
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Table 5. Focus Group Sample Description 
 Younger 
Adults 
(N = 26) 
Older 
 Adults 
(N = 34) 
Age: M (SD) 20.88 (2.03) 69.45 (4.95) 
Gender: % (N)   
   Male 50% (13) 41% (14) 
   Female 50% (13) 59% (20) 
Education: % (N)   
   ≤ High school 15% (4) 36% (12) 
   Vocational training, some college,   
   Associate’s degree 
62% (16) 33% (11) 
   Bachelor’s, Master’s Doctoral    
   Degree 
23% (6) 32% (11) 
Ethnicity: % (N)   
   Hispanic 11 % (3) 3 % (1) 
   Non-Hispanic White 58 % (15) 41 % (14) 
   Non-Hispanic Black 8 % (2) 47 % (16) 
   Other 23 % (6) 9 % (3) 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
Materials 
Materials for the study included questionnaires and a focus group script 
(described below), as well as audio recording equipment. The focus group script can be 
found in Appendix A; all questionnaires can be found in Appendix C. 
Demographic and Health Questionnaire 
The demographic questionnaire (see Czaja et al., 2006a) gathered broad 
characteristics of the sample including age, gender, ethnicity, and work status; the health 
questionnaire gathered self-reported health status, satisfaction with health, and number of 
medical problems.  
Technology Experience Questionnaire 
The technology experience questionnaire (see Czaja et al., 2006b) gathered 
information about technology experience, usage, and attitudes. 
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Focus Group Script 
The focus group script was designed to elicit in-depth discussion of privacy and 
related topics. The script began by introducing the moderator and assistant moderator / 
note taker, and welcoming participants to the study. Next, purposes of the study and 
ground rules for polite participation were explained (e.g., there are no right or wrong 
answers, please do not interrupt others while they are speaking). Third, the script 
addressed the use of voice recorders during the focus group and explained how and to 
what extent the discussion would be kept confidential. This included instructions to 
participants that they should keep the contents of the discussion to themselves after 
leaving the study setting. Finally, after a brief ice breaker question to get people talking, 
the script moved on to the focus of the study: a discussion of privacy across technologies. 
Definition questions were designed to gather individual definitions of privacy as 
well as group-generated definitions of privacy. Participants were first asked to provide 
their own individual definition of privacy in written form. Then, participants were asked 
to discuss their definitions of privacy and list the different aspects of privacy from each 
of their definitions. Groups were not instructed to come to a consensus, rather they were 
asked to explore and acknowledge differences between definitions. Discussion questions 
were open ended questions about general thoughts and opinions about privacy. For 
example, one question asked participants to reflect back to the last time they thought 
about privacy before the current session.  
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Table 6. Privacy Scenarios 
Category Scenario
1. Photo Sharing You have a lifetime of photos you are thinking of storing 
on a website. 
2. Identity Theft You are using your credit card to buy dinner in your 
favorite restaurant. When the waiter picks up the bill with 
your card in it, he takes the card in the other room for 5 
minutes. 
3. Health Disclosure You have the symptoms of an illness that have lasted for 
over a week. You call your doctor’s office and describe 
your symptoms to a nurse. 
4. Location Tracking You are using a cell phone with a locating device (such as 
GPS). You find out that there is a way for anyone in the 
world to find out your exact location. 
5. Surveillance Atlanta is trying to crack down on traffic violations by 
installing traffic cameras on every stop light. These 
cameras monitor traffic and then take a snapshot of 
anything out of the ordinary, such as someone running a 
red light. (Red-light camera) 
6. Self Disclosure & 
Relationship Building 
You are having a conversation with friends at home. 
 
The scenario questions covered six main topics: photo sharing, identity theft, 
health disclosure, location tracking, surveillance, and self-disclosure/relationship 
building. The scenarios are presented in Table 6. Each scenario was discussed for 
approximately 20 minutes and included discussion of standard probes (probes that were 
given after each scenario) and scenario-specific probes. An example of questions asked 
after Scenario 1 is given in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Example Privacy Scenario with Probe 
Scenario 
You have a lifetime of photos you are thinking of storing on a website. 
a. Standard Probes 
i. Do you have any privacy issues or concerns with this situation? 
ii. What about this situation makes it concerning? 
iii. Why? 
b. Additions to this scenario 
i. What if you used a scrapbook? 
ii. What about an online photo album (like Flickr, Picasa, Snapfish, 
etc - Only say these if participants ask for examples.)? 
iii. What about if they were just photos from a recent trip? 
iv. What if there were sensitive photos included in your set? 
v. What if you could pick exactly who saw the photos? 
 
Equipment 
Voice Recording Device 
All focus group interviews were recorded using an Olympus DM-20 or Olympus 
DS-30 voice recorder. Interviews were transferred to PC and converted to mp3 format for 
transcription.  
Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
Focus group transcripts were coded using MAXqda (version 2k3), a software tool 
designed for qualitative data analysis. A screen shot of the MAXqda interface is shown in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Screenshot of MAXqda coding interface 
  
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants filled out the demographics and health 
and technology experience questionnaires. Next, participants completed the individual 
privacy definition task and then participated in a group discussion of privacy definitions. 
Following the discussion of privacy definitions, participants were asked to describe the 
last time they had thought about privacy and asked to share these stories with the group. 
The scenario questions represented the majority of time and deep discussion. 
First, each scenario was read from the focus group script. Sometimes the scenario 
generated discussion without the need for a probe, however, most often the first general 
probe was presented as a way to encourage participants to express their reactions to the 
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scenario. Once the discussion following a probe ran its course (i.e., topics were repeated 
or participants became quiet indicating the conclusion of a specific topic for discussion) 
or the time allowed (generally regulated by the moderator) for a topic was up, the 
moderator moved on to the next probe. If a topic covered by a subsequent probe was 
brought up by a participant and thus discussed out of turn, the moderator either skipped 
the probe later in the script, or followed up if specific items required further discussion. 
This procedure was repeated for each of the six scenarios. 
After all scenarios were discussed, participants were asked to repeat the individual 
definition exercise. At the end of the session, participants were debriefed, remunerated 
via check or experimetrix credit and thanked. 
Data Analysis 
To assess privacy behaviors and feelings, participants’ verbatim transcribed 
responses were coded using a qualitative coding scheme. 
Segmentation & Category Development 
First, all transcripts were segmented. A segment is a section of text to be 
analyzed. Each segment serves as one unit to be analyzed. For the purposes of this 
analysis, a segment is defined as, “a feeling or behavior related to privacy”. Each 
segment may only contain one behavior or feeling. A privacy behavior is defined as an 
action or reaction of a person, more specifically, “activities in response to external or 
internal stimuli” (VandenBos, 2007, p. 107), whereas a privacy feeling is defined as, as 
the conscious subjective experience of emotion, or more specifically, “a self-contained 
phenomenal experience” (VandenBos, 2007, p. 371).  
After all texts were segmented, an iterative category generation strategy was 
applied to construct a final coding scheme. Using this approach, one of four coders who 
were working simultaneously assigned a label describing the general idea of the segment. 
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Then, the next segment was either a) assigned the same label as the first segment if that 
label was appropriate (i.e., accurately describes the idea of the segment, at a higher level 
than the segment itself), or b) given a new label that describes the general idea of that 
segment. The same decision criterion was applied to all following segments: either label 
the segment with an existing code, or create a new code. After the initial coding scheme 
was developed, a grouping and pruning process was applied where similar categories 
were combined (and renamed when appropriate) and those categories containing very 
few segments were eliminated. This process was done collaboratively with all coders 
involved. Segments from these categories were reassigned to alternative categories where 
appropriate. When an alternative category did not exist, remaining segments were placed 
in an “other” category. Thus, each segment was grouped naturally by label. Discrepancies 
in the labeling of a particular segment were resolved through discussion until a consensus 
could be reached. 
Coding Procedures 
The coding scheme was organized hierarchically. Behaviors served as the parent 
code for hierarchically organized sub codes. These sub codes serve as more specific 
labels for each segment. For example, a segment was first coded at the highest level 
behavior category (avoidance, modification, alleviatory), then coded at the lowest level 
(e.g., be vague). 
For maximum understandability, each segment was kept in context during coding. 
This means that although segments had already have been identified as distinct from non-
segmented text, they were presented to the coder within the original surrounding text 
during coding so that the coder could easily examine contextual cues. 
Within each dimension, segments were categorized at the lowest hierarchical 
level possible. For example, the segment, “When I bring my laptop to school to use… I 
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have wireless but I always plug it in here just to sort of reduce that, that potential for 
stealing various information.,” was coded as:  
 Behavior 
 Avoidance 
 Avoid using device/system AND use alternative medium 
because the segment was a behavior where the respondent avoided performing some 
action (in this case, use a wifi network) then used an alternative medium to perform the 
intended action (i.e., use a network cable instead of wifi). A complete version of the 
coding scheme is provided in Appendix D. 
Intercoder Agreement 
Final intercoder agreement was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa, a method of 
calculating observer agreement of categorical data that accounts for agreements due to 
chance. Kappas of .61 - .80 are considered “substantial” where the only category above 
“substantial” is “almost perfect” (Kappas of . 81 – 1.00; Landis & Koch, 1977). Overall 
intercoder agreement (between the author and one other coder) at the highest behavior 
category level was Cohen’s Kappa = .89 (i.e., almost perfect) suggesting strong 
agreement between coders. The authors’ coding was used for data analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS OF STUDY 1: PRIVACY BEHAVIORS 
 
In the following section I describe results from two separate but related analyses. 
First I present a qualitative analysis of privacy behaviors. In this analysis I identify, 
categorize and describe privacy behaviors across technologies and age groups. Following 
this analysis, I present a quantitative analysis of privacy behaviors and show how 
reported behaviors differ across type of technology and age group. Following the results 
chapter, I present a general discussion of these results in light of existing theories of 
privacy and how these results may influence design. 
Qualitative Analysis of Privacy Behaviors 
Three high level privacy behavior categories emerged from the data: avoidance, 
modification, and alleviatory behavior. Beneath each of these higher level categories, 
behaviors were grouped into lower level codes that represented more specific 
descriptions of types of behaviors (see Figure 4 for conceptual representation). For the 
purpose of discussion, there were 5 avoidance behavior categories, 5 modification 
behavior categories, and 5 alleviating behavior categories (though, at a different level of 
analysis there were arguably more sub-categories identified). In the following section I 
provide a description of each of the higher level groupings of behaviors (i.e., avoidance, 
modification, and alleviatory) as well as descriptions of the lower level groups. Direct, 
representative quotes, exemplifying each low level category are provided. 
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Figure 4. Hierarchical Coding of Privacy Behaviors 
 
Behaviors clustered into three high level categories: avoidance, modification, and 
alleviatory. Avoidance behaviors included not performing an originally intended action 
because of privacy concerns and engaging in a behavior to avoid a situation where 
privacy would be an issue. Modification behaviors included performing an action but not 
in the originally intended manner. Alleviatory behaviors involved taking actions to 
prevent the spread of information, reduce consequences, and determine whether further 
(mitigating) steps needed to be taken. 
Avoidance Behaviors 
Participants discussed a variety of behaviors designed to avoid situations where 
privacy would be a concern or would be violated. For example, participants hid private 
information so that it was not available to others (thus avoiding the spread of 
information), avoided using devices/systems when they thought use of the system would 
result in a breach of privacy, and avoided behaving in the way the originally intended by 
censoring their actions and words when they thought their privacy was at risk. The most 
commonly reported avoidance behaviors were: avoiding using a device/system, censoring 
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the self, and selective sharing. Each of these behavior categories is described in detail 
below; a summary of avoidance behaviors is presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Avoidance Behaviors 
Category Description Examples 
Avoid listening to someone 
else 
Try not to listen to other 
people’s conversations 
“Turn a deaf ear and forget 
about it.” 
Avoid using device/system Avoid using a system 
because of privacy-invasive 
features 
“I remember seeing a 
commercial where your 
friends could pull out their 
cell phone and they could 
see you as a dot on that.  
And when I saw that, I 
thought there is no way I’d 
ever get that cell phone.” 
Avoid using device/system 
AND use alternative 
medium 
Avoid using a system 
because of privacy-invasive 
features AND use an 
alternative system to 
accomplish same task 
“If I’m ordering something 
from Gap, I’ll just go and 
get it from Gap.” 
Avoid those 
devices/systems where 
security assurance not 
provided 
Avoid using a system 
specifically because 
security assurance is not 
provided 
“Maybe just same 
difference for a wireless 
network, some are secured 
and some are not.  If it’s not 
secured then I might not 
want to even access my e-
mail through that.” 
Censor self (by not doing 
something or not saying 
something) 
Refrain from performing an 
action or saying something 
“If I feel uncomfortable 
telling it to them, I won’t 
tell it to them.” 
Hiding Hide self or some 
information 
“Well, I would just make 
sure that I keep it 
somewhere very safe, and 
not just like put it anywhere 
in my house where people 
could just pick it up and 
look through it.  I would 
keep it somewhere hidden.” 
Selective Sharing (content 
& recipient) 
Refrain from sharing 
content or by selecting 
recipients 
“You could choose what 
you want to say, too.” 
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Avoiding using a device/system 
Participants reported having avoided using devices/systems in the past because of 
privacy concerns and also that they would avoid devices/systems they had not used 
before, but that were mentioned during the focus group discussion. As an example of the 
former, one participant reported that he had stopped using one instant messaging system 
in exchange for a different system because of experiences he had where he 
unintentionally disclosed information to an unintended recipient: 
“The old AIM, I use Trillian now, but the old AIM right when someone messages 
you, then it becomes, that window gets the focus.  So, if you’re typing something 
to someone else or going to a website and then right when they IM you and that 
screen comes up, and then you’re, you have to go directly there, you press enter.  
Then they see exactly what you were typing to someone else or for someone 
else... That’s why I got out of AIM and I started using Trillian.” 
-YA Male 
  
In this case, the participant was unhappy with his ability to control what information was 
transmitted to which recipient. He decided to avoid this system in the future, and chose to 
use a different system where this control was easier to maintain instead. 
Participants also reported that they would avoid using certain devices/systems if 
they felt the device/system collected, stored, or transmitted information about them to 
someone they did not want to have this information. For example, participants reported 
that they would avoid cell phones that tracked and transmitted their location, refuse to use 
a credit card in an online purchase, and refuse to share photos online because these 
technologies would provide information to unintended or unknown entities. Other 
participants mentioned that they would only use such systems if given security assurance 
such as the “little lock at the bottom right” (Male, YA) referring to SSL encryption icon 
in some internet browsers (e.g., Firefox), or only using a secured wifi network (vs. an 
unsecured network). 
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Censoring the Self 
Another commonly reported behavior was self censoring. In this category of 
behavior, participants avoided taking certain actions or saying things because of privacy 
concerns. For example, one participant described how her concerns about privacy led her 
to behave in a way that is different from how she would have otherwise behaved: 
“you know…when you’re in an elevator and you see there’s a security camera 
and like… if it’s really obvious you get kind of  conscious about like…how 
you’re standing or what you’re doing. Like you’re not going to scratch your butt 
in front of the camera.” 
-YA Female 
 
In this case, the participant becomes aware that she is under observation from a security 
camera, begins to feel self-conscious, and refrains from performing an action that she 
feels would be inappropriate for (unspecified) other people to observe. 
Similarly, participants reported censoring themselves with respect to speech. 
Participants avoided certain topics (e.g., religion, politics) altogether, and also reported 
that they would avoid discussing topics that were “sensitive”, “serious”, or “touchy”. 
This behavior is distinct from selective sharing in that comments categorized as self 
censoring were behaviors where topics were avoided altogether, whereas in selective 
sharing participants choose to share some pieces of information, while refraining from 
sharing others. 
Selective Sharing 
Selective sharing took two distinct, albeit related, forms: content restriction and 
recipient restriction. Both forms of selective sharing involve withholding information. In 
content restriction, a person refrains from sharing some pieces of information while 
sharing other pieces of information. In recipient restriction, a person refrains from sharing 
with some people, while sharing with others. 
 
 
 59   
Content restriction 
Content restriction behaviors are those behaviors where a person withholds 
certain information, but shares other information. This is different from censoring the self 
in that censoring the self involves completely avoiding performing an action or 
discussing a certain topic, while content restriction involved limiting what is shared. For 
example, in a medical context if a participant was engaged in censoring behavior, they 
would completely avoid a topic they considered embarrassing. On the other hand, if they 
were engaged in content restriction behavior they would share certain parts of the 
embarrassing information but avoid mentioning the most embarrassing parts. As a 
specific example, one participant described a situation where they engaged in content 
restriction behavior: 
“And some of the symptoms, if I did have them I might not necessarily put them 




Recipient restriction  
Recipient restriction is where a person withholds information from some people, 
but shares the same information with other people. In recipient restriction, similar to 
censoring the self, whole topics may be avoided, but notably, only avoided in the 
presence of certain people; here the person rather than the topic is the focus of the 
comment (i.e., segment). In recipient restriction, the focus of the restricting behavior is on 
the person who would receive the information. The intent of the behavior is to withhold 
information from some people, but not others. For example, one participant described a 
situation where they were interested in discussing something with their family but had to 
wait for a friend to leave the conversation before they could speak freely: 
“Or it could be a family, a whole family, sitting down with one friend.  And you 
don’t want that one friend to hear that, you let the friend go, then you start the 
conversation over again.” 
-OA Female 
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In this case, the recipient is the focus of the avoidance behavior, rather than the topic per 
se.  
Summary of Avoidance Behaviors 
Avoidance behaviors are ones where a participant engages in behaviors to avoid 
situations when privacy would be a concern. These include refusing to perform certain 
actions, discuss whole topics, discuss certain parts of a topic, or disclose information to 
certain people. Avoidance behaviors are related yet distinct from modification behaviors 
and alleviatory behaviors, both of which are introduced below. 
Modification Behaviors 
When participants chose to engage in a situation rather than avoid it, they often 
modified their behaviors for privacy reasons. These modification behaviors included 
taking extra care (“being careful”), being vague and/or limiting the depth of the things 
they said, otherwise modifying what they said so as to be appropriate for a particular 
audience, not doing/saying something in front of others, doing/saying quietly, and using a 
code or different language. The most commonly reported modification behaviors were 
being careful, not [doing/saying something] in front of others, and being vague. Each of 
these modification behaviors is described in detail below. 
Being Careful 
Across scenarios, participants reported that there were times when they had to 
exert effort to be careful, take extra care, or be cautious. Often participants reported that 
they needed to be careful with respect to what they said. For example, one participant 
explained that when talking to a friend, “the wisest thing is be careful with your 
conversation” (OA Male). Other participants noted that they needed to be careful with 
their behaviors: “It is something [others taking photos of you] you need to be careful of 
because, like you [another participant] said, I mean you don’t necessarily want everybody 
know what it is that you were doing” (YA Female). 
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Not in Front of Others 
Often participants would modify their behavior to ensure that they were not 
within earshot or line of sight of other people. Here, participants explicitly described 
behaviors intended to put physical distance between them and others. This could include 
behaviors where a dyad or group moved to be out of range of others, or an individual who 
moved to be out of range of everyone else. For example, one participant explained how 
she moved to a location where she could not be heard by others when she received a call 
from her physician: 
“I had an appointment like last week and they called me to like confirm my 
appointment, or they called me back so I could make an appointment. I was at 
work, and there was like three guys in the room. I definitely like went like out in 
the hallway.” 
- YA Female 
  
In addition to being out of earshot or line of sight of other people, participants 
also described that they took steps to be out of range of some technologies. For example, 
one participant described that he made attempts to try to “get away from any recording 
device” (YA Male) when he discussed “work deals” he did not want others to know 
about. 
Being Vague 
Another way participants modified their verbal behavior, in particular, was by 
being “vague.” This could include being purposefully unclear, using double entendre 
(i.e., making meaning ambiguous), or simply leaving out details. Often participants 
explicitly described their behavior as “being vague” (verbatim quote), but also included 
in this category are quotes that express similar meaning. For example, “be general about 
it” (YA Male), don’t “go into any detail” (OA Female), explain things “not in full detail” 
(YA Male). Being vague is similar to content restriction and censoring self in that the 
idea behind all three is to limit the outflow of information. However, each accomplishes 
this goal in a different way (see Table 9). In being vague, participants take actions to 
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make the meaning of what they are saying ambiguous, except, perhaps, to someone who 
already has preexisting knowledge. In content restriction, participants are clear in what 
they say, but they limit what they say, and in censoring the self, participants avoid 
discussing topics altogether. In “limiting distribution” which is an alleviatory behavior 
described in the next section, participants describe how they limit the ways information 
that has already been collected is disbursed. 
Table 9. Controlling the Outflow of Information 
Censor Self Content Restriction Being Vague Limit Distribution 
Avoid discussing 
entire topics (e.g., 
“sensitive” topics, 
religion, politics) 
Avoid sharing some 
content, but share 
other content fully 




ambiguous, use double 
entendre, leave out 
details so that only one 
someone with prior 
knowledge may 
understand (e.g., “I’m 
not feeling wel.l” vs. 
“My arm is oozing.” 
After information 
has flowed out and 









The final group of reported behaviors was alleviatory behavior. Alleviatory 
behaviors occur only after information has been collected and involve actions taken to 
prevent the spread of information, reduce consequences, and determine whether further 
(mitigating) steps need to be taken. Alleviatory behaviors fell into one of two broad 
categories: external locus and internal locus. External locus meant that someone besides 
the participant had control over the piece of information in question, whereas internal 
locus meant that the participant had direct control over the information. Both categories 
of behavior are described in detail below. 
External Locus 
External locus alleviatory behaviors are behaviors that involve asking a person 
(other than the participant) who was in control of the participant’s information to take 
some action on behalf of the participant. These included asking the person not to share 
information in the first place or asking the person to remove information, or “un-share”, 
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information that was currently shared. For example, one participant explained how he 
would ask someone not to share a photo of him with others: “I’d just say hey do you 
mind not showing that one?” (YA Male). If information had already been shared but 
sharing was not desired, participants reported that they would ask others to take down the 
information. For example, also with respect to a photo, one participant stated that they 
would ask the person who posted the photo to simply “untag it” (YA Female), referring 
to the tagging feature on the social networking site facebook that allows the owner of a 
photo to “tag” people in the photo associating the image with the name and identity of the 
person in the photo. 
External locus alleviating behaviors were behaviors that, by nature, involved 
asking someone else (besides the participant) to take some action because at that point in 
the information cycle, the other person was the one who had control over the information. 
In Internal locus behaviors, on the other hand, participants themselves had control over 
their information.  
Internal Locus 
Internal locus alleviating behaviors were behaviors that involved information that 
the participant was in control of. These behaviors included limiting distribution, 
destroying evidence, checking, requesting permission, altering information/images, and 
claiming innocence. Of these behaviors, limiting distribution, destroying evidence, and 
checking were the most common. 
Limiting Distribution 
Limiting distribution has to do with limiting the transmission of information that 
has already been collected. After an act has been committed, whether modified or not, 
and collected by some means it can either be transmitted or not transmitted (distributed or 
not distributed). Along this continuum of transmission from not shared with anyone to 
shared with everyone, there are countless (though perhaps reasonable categories of) 
points in between (see Figure 5). Limiting distribution includes limiting the transmission 
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of information by attempting to ensure that sharing falls somewhere short of “shared with 
everyone.” 
 
Figure 5. Continuum of Sharing 
 
When participants described limiting distribution, the topic they most often 
discussed was photo sharing. Participants described how after photos of them had been 
taken they would limit the distribution of those photos by not sharing them with others. 
They reported that they would not share them online, on facebook, or by showing hard 
copies to others. In some ways limiting distribution mirrors selective sharing of content, 
however a key difference is that selective sharing of content occurs before an act is 
committed, and limiting distribution only occurs (and can only occur) after an act is 
committed and recorded. As with selective sharing, when participants described limiting 
distribution, they not only talked about limiting distribution of content, sometimes they 
also discussed limiting distribution to certain others. One participant described how he 
“would just make it [a set of photos] so my friends could see it,” (Male YA) while 
another participant framed sharing in terms of who could not see the photos: “but 
definitely I wouldn’t want certain people, like my parents, seeing [all my photos]” (Male 
YA). 
Destruction of Evidence 
Related, but worth discussing separately, is destruction of evidence. In this 
behavior participants described an extreme version of ensuring that evidence of some past 
act (act here could be as simple as disclosing a name and address) would not be shared 
with anyone in the future: purposefully destroying evidence of the act. Participants 
described destroying photos, destroying devices that recorded their actions, shredding old 
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credit cards, shredding physical mail, and deleting internet browsing history. In all of 
these cases information about a participant had already been recorded and the participant 
described behaviors designed to destroy this record. 
Checking 
Checking behavior involves taking effort to inspect information about a 
participant that is kept by others. This may include inspecting records to ensure that 
(usually financial) information is not being used without permission and inspecting other 
documents (such as friend’s facebook pages) to identify what information, related to the 
participant, is being shared with others. Participants described checking credit card bills 
and online interim statements to make sure there were no erroneous charges: “I kept 
checking my credit card to see if anyone made like ridiculous charges” (YA Female); 
“you have to make sure you check them all the time” (OA Female) and checking to see if 
photos of them had been posted online. Notably, participants felt that it was their 
responsibility to engage in checking behavior to avoid unintended consequences: “If 
you’re not checking, then it’s kinda your fault, too” (YA Female). 
Summary of Qualitative Analysis of Privacy Behaviors 
Three high-level privacy behavior categories emerged from the interview data 
collected for this study. The three behavioral categories were avoidance, modification, 
and alleviatory behavior. Within each high-level category, I identified lower level 
behaviors that were composed of more specific subcategories of behavior. Many of the 
reported behaviors were related to sharing specific information with some people while 
keeping it from others. In the previous section I provided a description of each behavior 
and behavioral category. In the following section I present an analysis of how the 
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Quantitative Analysis of Privacy Behaviors 
After behaviors were coded into categories, the number of behaviors in each high-
level category (i.e., avoidance, modification, and alleviatory) were subjected to chi-
square analyses to determine whether there were quantitative differences  in behavior 
across type of technology and with respect to age. An alpha level of .05 was used for all 
statistical tests. 
Behavior Distribution 
A chi-square goodness of fit test was performed to determine whether the three 
behaviors were reported equally. Overall, participants reported more avoidance behaviors 






Reported Behaviors by Age Group 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship 
between age group and reported behavior. Type of reported behavior differed across age 
group 2(2, N = 507) = 22.73, p = .001. 
To determine which cell or cells produced the statistically significant results, 
residuals (the difference between the observed frequency and the expected frequency) 
were converted to z-scores and compared to a critical value corresponding to an alpha of 
0.05 (i.e., +/- 1.96). Avoidance behaviors were overrepresented for older adults, whereas 
alleviatory behaviors were overrepresented for younger adults (’s < .05; see Table 10). 
The number of modification behaviors reported was similar for older and younger adults. 
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Avoidance* 45% 62% 
Modification 28% 27% 
Alleviatory* 27% 11% 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
* p<.05 
 
Behavior across Scenario 
For the purpose of analysis of behavior across scenario, data from older and 
younger adults were combined (separately some cells contained less than 5, the minimum 
for chi-square analysis). Despite being reported with the greatest frequency overall, 
avoidance behavior was not the most commonly reported behavior across all scenarios. 
For example, in photo sharing alleviatory behaviors were most common and in health 
disclosure modification behaviors were most common. To assess these differences across 
scenarios, adjusted residuals were examined (as described above). 
Photo Sharing 
With respect to photo sharing, participants most often described alleviatory rather 
than avoidance or modification behaviors (Table 11). For example, participants 
mentioned limiting distribution of photos by not uploading them to a photo sharing or 
social networking site (e.g., facebook) more often than avoiding taking the photo in the 
first place. 





Note: Percentages were rounded. 
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Identity Theft 
For the identity theft scenario, avoidance was the most commonly reported 
behavior (Table 12). For example, participants reported that they would refuse to give a 
credit card number over the phone (FG2), “try to find somewhere else to go where you 
can go hide in the corner” (FG2), use a wired internet connection instead of wireless 
(FG3), refuse to use a wireless network that was not secured, use an alternative payment 
system (cash instead of a credit card), purchase an item at a brick and mortar store rather 
than an online store, and use a service like pay-pal instead of pay with a credit card. They 
also would not type personal information while in a crowded room where what they were 
typing might be visible (FG2). 
Table 12. Identity Theft 




Note: Percentages were rounded. 
*p<0.05 (i.e., category is significantly over or underrepresented) 
 
Health Disclosure 
For the health disclosure scenario, modification was the most frequently reported 
behavior (Table 13). Participants reported that they would not share certain pieces of 
information while in a waiting room in front of other patients, would be vague when 
describing their medical conditions, and would whisper or speak quietly so others would 
not hear what they were saying to a health care provider. 
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Note: Percentages were rounded. 




For the location tracking scenario, avoidance was the most commonly reported 
behavior (Table 14). Participants reported that they had refused to use devices because 
they contained location tracking functionality, would turn off a system if it had location 
tracking functionality, would turn off the function itself, would restrict the level of detail 
about the content of their location and would restrict who might have access to this 
information. 






Note: Percentages were rounded. 
*p<0.05 (i.e., category is significantly over or underrepresented) 
 
Surveillance 
For the surveillance scenario, avoidance was the most commonly reported 
behavior, though all behavioral categories were reported with expected frequency (Table 
15). Participants reported that they would censor their own behavior and not engage in 
risky behaviors (e.g., not run red lights) while being surveilled. 
  
 70   





Note: Percentages were rounded. 
*p<0.05 (i.e., category is significantly over or underrepresented) 
 
Self-Disclosure 
For the self-disclosure scenario, avoidance was the most commonly reported 
behavior (Table 16), though they were reported with the expected frequency. 
Modification behaviors, on the other hand, were reported more frequently than expected. 
Modification behaviors included being careful with what was said, not saying certain 
things in front of other people, and being vague. 






Note: Percentages were rounded. 
*p<0.05 (i.e., category is significantly over or underrepresented) 
 
Summary of Quantitative Analysis of Privacy Behaviors 
During the qualitative analysis, three high level privacy behavior categories 
emerged: avoidance, modification, and alleviatory behavior. In the quantitative analysis, I 
examined how the frequency of reported behaviors differed with respect to age group and 
technology type. Overall, participants were most likely to report avoidance-related 
behaviors. However, in further analyses, older adults reported more avoidance behaviors 
than expected, whereas younger adults reported more alleviatory behaviors than 
expected. In addition, reported behaviors differed across different technology types. In 
the following section I will discuss the implications of these results on existing theories 
of privacy and present implications for design. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION OF FOCUS GROUP RESULTS 
 
In this study I examined users’ everyday privacy behaviors. Based on this 
examination I determined that there were a variety of privacy behaviors, but that there 
were also commonalities in reported behaviors. Behaviors grouped into one of three 
categories: avoidance, modification, and alleviation. Within each of these high level 
groups, sub-behaviors were also identified and described. Behaviors were reported with 
differing frequency across technology context (scenario) and reported with different 
frequency by each of the two age groups.  
The behaviors and sub-behaviors identified have a number of implications both in 
terms of theory and in terms of design. The remainder of the discussion is organized as 
follows: First, I discuss how the identification of groupings of everyday privacy 
behaviors across technologies suggests an alternative to the claim that privacy is too 
contextual a topic to understand at a psychological level. Instead, I propose that the 
commonalities identified in this study suggest a way to organize many of the previous 
findings in privacy and HCI. Then, I contrast the groups of privacy behaviors identified 
in this study to Altman’s proposed privacy regulation mechanisms and show how the 
alternative grouping may be useful to designers. Next, I discuss the findings in relation to 
Altman’s model of privacy regulation and suggest that Altman’s model does not reflect 
users’ privacy behaviors. Then, based on the empirical investigation, I propose an 
alternative model of privacy regulation. Finally, I discuss how these theoretical 
contributions relate to design. 
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Theoretical Implications 
The results of this study suggest that common privacy behaviors (e.g., avoidance, 
modification and alleviation) exist across technologies and contexts. This result is to 
some extent inconsistent with a general claim in the privacy literature: that it is 
impossible to draw generalities about privacy in HCI.  Multiple previous reports state that 
the experience and definition of privacy is different for everyone. For example, 
Ackerman and Maiwaring (2005, pg. 6) claimed that privacy is “extremely contextual, 
based in the specifics of by who, for what, where, why, and when a system is being used” 
and Karat, Karat and Brodie (2008) claimed that, “privacy can and does mean different 
things to different people.” The sentiment underlying both of these statements and the 
many others making similar claims (see Caine, 2008 for additional discussion) is that 
because privacy is different in different contexts and across people, researchers cannot 
gain a basic understanding of privacy and that privacy must be studied, not at a general 
level, but only at the level of an individual technology. 
This study suggests an alternative to this view. I propose that the results of this 
study suggest that there are commonalities in the way people discuss and behave with 
respect to privacy. In addition, the commonalities identified in this study suggest a way to 
organize many of the previous findings in the field of privacy and HCI. For example, the 
finding that girls reported taking a phone to a private area of the house to have voice 
conversations (March & Flueriot, 2006) could be classified under “hiding” (an avoidance 
behavior), and the access control technology that utilizes testing for shared knowledge 
developed by Toomin, Zhang, Fogarty & Landay (2008) could be considered a solution 
 73   
to the issue of selective sharing. As described in the following section, the categories 
identified in this study are different from previous categorizations of privacy behaviors.  
Everyday Behaviors vs. Behavioral Mechanisms 
Altman (1975) proposes that people use behavioral mechanisms to achieve 
privacy goals. In his conceptualization, if a person recognizes that they have less privacy 
than they want, they may engage in behaviors designed to lessen their interaction; 
alternatively, if a person recognizes they have more privacy than they want, they may 
engage in behaviors to increase their interaction.   
To describe this notion, Altman introduces the ideas “interpersonal control” and 
“interpersonal boundary regulation,” both of which refer to the notion of a person 
“maintaining an appropriate and desired level of interaction between themselves and the 
external physical and social environment.” To maintain the appropriate level of 
interaction, people regulate privacy to a desired level by using behavioral mechanisms 
(Table 17).  Behavioral mechanisms used to achieve privacy goals include verbal 
behavior, paraverbal behavior, nonverbal behavior, personal space, territoriality and 
culture (Altman, & Chemers, 1980; Altman 1975). 
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Verbal the contents of what a 
person says 
Saying: 
 “Let’s talk” 
 “Can I raise an issue with you” 
 “Sorry, I’m too busy now” 
 “No, I can’t make it this evening” 
Para Verbal way of speaking, how 
someone says something 
Speaking in a cool or warm tone 
Non Verbal communication without 
words including posture, 
gaze, facial expressions and 
gestures 
 body orientation 




 looking away 
 fidgeting with own clothing 
 rubbing own hands together 
 looking at our watches 
 assuming rigid, symmetrical body 
positions 
Personal Space "the space within an 
invisible boundary around 
people that is with them 
everywhere they go." 
(Altman & Chemers, 1980, 
p. 102) 
 increase or decrease physical distance 
between self and another person 
o by backing away 
o by moving closer 
 
Territory control and ownership of a 
place by a person or group 
 invite someone into a territory they 
occupy 
 closing a door 
 use signs saying keep out or welcome 
 offering a chair 
 providing refreshments 
 not inviting in 
Culture customs, rules and norms 
which communicate 
availability to other 
members in the same culture 
 not dropping by a friend’s house at dinner 
time 
 too early in the morning or too late at 
night avoiding 
 coming to parties too early and leaving at 
a reasonable hour 
 not opening shut doors (at least without 
knocking) etc.)               
(Altman & Chemers, 1980; Altman, 1975) 
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However, because of the general nature of Altman’s grouping of behavioral 
mechanisms, designers find it difficult to guide design: “It is by no means an easy task to 
apply Altman’s theory of privacy to the problem of designing.” (Boyle, 2005).  Because 
Altman’s analysis was top down, the mechanisms identified may not represent users’ 
ideas about privacy, especially as it relates to technology. The grouping of behaviors in 
this study was not imposed top down as Altman’s was. Instead I used a bottom up 
category generation coding strategy; groups of behaviors emerged from the data. Thus, 
unlike Altman’s top down, conceptual analysis of privacy and categorization of privacy 
behaviors, the categories of everyday behaviors identified here are centered on users’ 
privacy vocabulary and experience. I propose that the alternative grouping of privacy 
behaviors described in this paper may prove to be more useful to designers and 
researchers. For example, as described above, these categories of everyday behavior 
suggest a way to organize previous findings from the privacy literature. I reserve a 
discussion of design implications for a separate section but will note here that the 
alternative categorization suggests multiple design options. 
Besides questioning Altman’s behavioral mechanisms of privacy, I also question 
Altman’s model of privacy regulation. In the following section, I present a critique of 
Altman’s model of privacy regulation and suggest an alternative model. 
Proposing an Alternative Model of Privacy Regulation 
The model of privacy regulation that Altman proposes is that of the “shifting 
permeability of a cell membrane” (Altman, 1975).  The membrane can be more open or 
less open depending on the desired level of privacy (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Adaptation of Altman's Model of Privacy Regulation 
 
In this hypothetical personal boundary the cell membrane may be more open—
where it is more receptive to interaction with others—or more closed where the “self” is 
less open to interaction.  Altman argues that this regulation is dynamic, meaning 
individuals, influenced by changing conditions, open or close themselves to others 
resulting in a desired level of interaction. Privacy is considered an optimizing process 
where people seek to interact not too much or too little, but at an optimal level. This 
openness/closedness cycle vacillates as if on a wavelength, suggesting that people will be 
more open, on the whole, then less open, on the whole. 
However, this analysis of privacy behaviors indicates that participants wanted to 
withhold information from some people while sharing with specific others. The idea of 
sharing specific information with specific others is contrary to Altman’s 
conceptualization of information sharing as like a “cell membrane”.  In his 
conceptualization, information sits behind a permeable wall. Information to be disclosed 
can pass through the permeable wall therefore being exposed to others. However, 
participants in the current study suggested a different model of boundary regulation 
where each piece of information was distinct AND each recipient was distinct. Thus, 
information could pass to one person without being exposed to all others. 
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For example, in selective sharing, participants not only wanted to selectively 
share content, they also wanted to selectively share with different people. This finding 
provides empirical support for Westin’s theoretical conceptualization of privacy as “the 
claim of individuals… to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967; p. 7) while running 
contrary to the conceptualization to Altman’s model of privacy regulation. Unlike a cell 
membrane, participants in this study described behaviors that allowed for them to be 
simultaneously open to some people while closed to others. Thus, I propose an alternative 
model of privacy regulation that reflects participants’ descriptions of privacy (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Alternative Model of Privacy Regulation 
 
In this alternative model of privacy regulation, a person may share some 
information with some people, all information with another person and no information 
with another person simultaneously. This implies that protecting privacy involves 
allowing people to share what they want to share with whom they want to share with 
while keeping the same information from others. This is consistent with multiple 
previous examinations of privacy in HCI that have suggested that one piece of 
information may be considered more or less private depending on whom that piece of 
information was going to be shared with (e.g., Adams, 1999; Consolvo et al., 2005; 
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Hawkey & Inkpen, 2005; Khalil & Connelly, 2006; Lederer, Mankoff, & Dey, 2003; 
Muller, Smith, Shoher, & Goldberg, 1991; Olson, Grudin, & Horvitz, 2005; Patil & Lai, 
2005). 
One prediction of the alternative model of privacy is that there will be an 
information type by information receiver interaction (see Figure 8). That is, neither the 
type of information, nor the information receiver alone predicts the level of perceived 
privacy of an event.  Rather, it is both of these variables in combination that predict the 
perceived privacy of an event.  For example, a high privacy information type (e.g. 
location information) may not be considered highly private when the information receiver 
is a spouse or significant other.  However, if the information receiver is a stranger then 





When we examine previous studies where both variables have been observed in 
combination, the relationship of perceived privacy (often operationalized as privacy 
comfort level or sharing preference) indeed differed based on both information type and 
information receiver.  For instance, in a study of web browser use, privacy comfort level 
was influenced by a combination of viewer (information receiver) and sensitivity of 
content (information type; Hawkey & Inkpen, 2006).  Similarly, for a project 
management groupware system, users who engaged in participatory design wanted to 





Figure 8. Information Type by Information Receiver Interaction
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restrict sharing different aspects of projects with a variety of potential information 
receivers (Mueller, Smith, Shoher & Goldberg, 1991). 
If these variables truly interact then it may not be appropriate to examine either in 
isolation as the results may appear contradictory, leading to the conclusion that “privacy 
means different things to different people”.  For example, to find out which types of 
information people consider the most private we need to specify an intended recipient or 
else risk that each participant imagines a different potential receiver of such information.  
It is likely that participants would perceive an invasion of privacy if we ask about giving 
out social security number, credit card information and birth date to “the public”.  
However, if we specify “your credit card company” as the receiver of such information, 
participants are less likely to claim an invasion of privacy. 
However, the alternative model of privacy presented here may not fully address 
the additional considerations that technology brings to privacy. A possible reason for the 
increase in concern over privacy is that technology changes the storage, search ability, 
reproducibility and availability of data and therefore may fundamentally change the 
conception of privacy (Sparck-Jones, 2003).  For example, if users realize that their data 
is stored for a longer period of time, more easily searched and reproduced more readily, 
their concerns about privacy may multiply. In the next section I propose an additional 
consideration for privacy in HCI. 
Proposing Multi-Stage Disclosure 
In general, the three categories of behavior that emerged can be thought of in a 
temporal order. Avoidance behaviors occur prior to some act, modification behaviors 
occur during an act, and alleviating behaviors occur after an act. However, because 
privacy may become a concern (or be realized as a concern) at more than one point in the 
 80   
life of a piece of information, this relationship is not perfect. In a non-recorded 
environment (no technology), an act is ephemeral; once it has been performed it is gone. 
It may exist in the memory of the actor or an audience member if there is one present. 
However, besides by being described and/or demonstrated by the actor or audience 
member, the act cannot be transmitted directly (reproduced) to any other entity. In an 
environment where technology (e.g., recording equipment) is present, the case is 
different. In a recorded environment an act, once captured, may be transmitted to any 
number of recipients. Therefore, disclosure in a technologically mediated environment is 
a multi-stage process.  
That is, opportunities for disclosure decisions occur in at least two separate 
moments. The first moment is prior to the first disclosure or act. At this moment, an 
individual considers whether he or she wants to act in front of or disclose to another 
person or group of people. At the second moment, an individual, realizing that 
information about them has been captured using some technology, then considers 
whether they want to disclose the information artifact to another person or group. 
Technology transforms the once single stage process of disclosure to a multi-stage 
process. As a result, designers should consider not only preserving privacy by designing 
for initial disclosure, but also at moments of secondary disclosure. In the next section I 
focus exclusively on suggestions for design. 
Opportunities for Design 
People have been managing privacy in non-mediated settings since pre-
civilization (Westin, 1967). Humans have developed many strategies for managing 
privacy that are intuitive, easy to use, and successful (i.e., useful for privacy 
management). Despite the facility with which people are able to manage privacy in non-
mediated settings, designing technologies that are privacy-sensitive has proven to be very 
difficult (e.g., within the ubiquitous computing domain; Lederer, Hong, Dey, & Lanaday, 
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2004). In the following section, I provide a number of suggestions to designers of 
privacy-sensitive systems to consider for helping people manage their privacy in a more 
intuitive way and propose opportunities for design. 
Support Users’ Existing Behaviors 
For most scenarios (with the exception of the surveillance scenario) there was a 
category of behavior that represented a majority of the reported behaviors. By examining 
the most frequently reported behavior from each scenario we may be able to determine 
how to support the behaviors users are already accustomed to using in a particular 
context. 
For example, the majority of behaviors reported for the photo sharing scenario 
were alleviatory behaviors. This suggests that people are currently waiting until after a 
photo has been taken and perhaps shared to begin managing privacy associated with the 
photo. Although one explanation for the difference in behavior could be due to a lack of 
awareness about what was captured in the photo, participants’ comments reveal an 
alternative explanation, one that mirrors the high-level finding of sharing with specific 
people: participants wanted to have photos and share those photos with certain people, 
but there were specific others they did not want to share with. For example, one 
participant described how she did not want to share already-taken photos on facebook 
because someone else would be jealous: 
“Yeah, I’ve had to deal with that ‘cause one of my like best guy friends; I liked 
him prior to like me dating my boyfriend now… my boyfriend doesn’t care… but, 
his girlfriend apparently is like really jealous.  And so, like we like go to football 
games, or we like we’ll meet for coffee, and like he’s asking like specifically … 
don’t like load up… my facebook with pictures of us.  Like I don’t care, but I 
don’t wanna hear about it from her.  And she knows who I am, and it’s not even 
that like I’m a threat, but she’s still like.  It would cause unnecessary issues 
between them, so I just don’t do it because of that kind of thing.” 
-YA Female 
 
 82   
This implies that designers should consider ways to enable users to easily share 
already-collected information with certain others and also engage in alleviatory 
behaviors, such as checking, destroying evidence, and asking others to remove or not 
share information about them. 
As another example, in general, older adults reported more avoidance behaviors 
than expected, whereas younger adults reported more alleviatory behaviors than 
expected. This could be due to younger adults’ previous experience with technology, 
especially technology that captures, stores, reproduces, and/or transmits captured 
information to others. Based on this finding, one suggestion could be to highlight 
avoidance behavior options in interfaces for older adults and highlight alleviatory 
behaviors in interfaces for younger adults.  Designs that focused on making these types of 
behaviors easier for users would likely seem intuitive for users since this is how they 
report managing privacy. However, supporting users’ existing behaviors is not the only 
design strategy that makes sense. Another strategy that may be used is to create supports 
where few strategies exist. 
Create Supports Where Few Strategies Exist 
The idea of creating supports where few strategies currently exist is the 
counterpoint to the previous suggestion to support users in existing behaviors. As 
opposed to supporting the types of behaviors users are already engaging in to manage 
their privacy, this is an opportunity for designers to create support where it is currently 
difficult or unlikely for users to engage in privacy regulation behaviors. 
The location tracking scenario is an example where participants reported a high 
number of avoidance behaviors. Thus, there is an opportunity to design alternatives that 
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are inspired by modification or alleviation (which were both significantly 
underrepresented). 
As another example, participants reported very few avoidance or modification 
behaviors during the discussion surrounding the photo-sharing scenario. Thus, there is an 
opportunity to design technologies aimed at supporting avoidance or modification 
privacy behaviors. One suggestion for an avoidance-enhancing technology for photo 
sharing could be a camera that requests an approval from the person in the photo before a 
photo is shared with others. This suggests an alternative model of ownership, where the 
subject of a photo becomes part owner of the content, rather than the photographer taking 
full ownership and control over the destiny of the photo.  
One notable point here is that avoidance behaviors were the most commonly 
reported behaviors across all scenarios. A substantial portion of these avoidance 
behaviors involved avoiding a specific technology in favor of another technology or 
method. This finding is consistent with other reports that privacy concerns lead to lack of 
adoption among technologies (e.g., Herbsleb, Atkins, Boyer, Handel & Finholt, 2002; 
Want, Hooper, Falc & Gibbons, 1992). Thus, if designers want users to adopt their 
technologies it is critical to create mechanisms that enable users to easily manage privacy 
using modification and/or alleviatory strategies, or else risk that users will engage in 
avoidance behaviors and thus may reject their technologies.  
Translate Behaviors into Design 
Perhaps the greatest opportunity for design lies in translating existing behaviors 
into digital instantiations. Participants in our study reported many different behaviors 
they are familiar with using and talking about. Thus, it seems likely that these ways 
 84   
people are already managing their privacy may inspire designs that are analogous to 
existing behavior. 
Facilitate Checking 
One behavior participants reported was to “checking” to make sure that 
something has or has not happened. Participants reported that they checked to see if 
charges were made, checked online postings to ensure they were accurate, and double 
checked to make sure information they planned to disclose was correct. Thus, a design 
implication is to facilitate checking. This could be done in a number of ways including 
making detailed account information available quickly as well as by providing previews 
and/or enhanced views highlighting information that may be particularly likely to be 
checked (e.g., information that had changed recently). 
For example, participants often reported that they would check their monthly bills 
to ensure that there were no erroneous charges. One way to facilitate this behavior might 
be to provide up-to-the minute access to the charges on an account (see Figure 9) in an 
online format. An alternative way to facilitate checking would be to provide proactive 
cues to participants about account activity. As one example, each charge on a particular 
account could result in a one time audio-only notification sent directly to a cellular 
phone. The notification could be a pleasant chime or ding that would signal that a charge 
had been made, but would not represent an interruption as it would require no action from 
the user. Users would likely become familiar with the notification in conjunction with 
account activity. However, if they received a notification when they had not made a 
charge, they would know to investigate the charge to determine whether or not it was 
appropriate (thus facilitating checking in situations where it is warranted).   
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Figure 9. Example of Checking Facilitation 
  
Another example of an everyday privacy behavior that can be easily translated in 
to a digital instantiation is the modification behavior “being vague”. Many participants 
described how in everyday interactions they modified what they disclosed by “being 
vague”. Participants described behaviors such as leaving out details, being purposefully 
unclear, or making the meaning of what they were disclosing ambiguous. Thus, one 
suggestion for design is to provide ways for people to share with others in a way that 
allows for ambiguity or not giving full detail. This everyday privacy behavior can be used 
to inspire an alternative “vague” input design. 
For example, consider a traditional online form that requires a user to input age 
information (Figure 10). This type of age input may be observed in countless computer 
based (and pen and paper) questionnaires. This type of input field requires very specific 
information and does not allow a user to engage in modification behaviors such as “being 
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vague”. Rather, if a user wanted to manage privacy by being vague when encountering 
this form they would be left three options. First, they could attempt to leave the input 
field blank. Second, they could fill the input field in with incorrect information, or third 
they could fill the input field in with the correct information. Only the third option 
provides any useful information at all; the first two provide either no information or 
contribute bad data. Clearly, none of these options is ideal. 
 
Figure 10. Traditional Age Input 
  
Being able to be vague may be especially important if the type of information is 
embarrassing or potentially embarrassing. However, if information is not embarrassing, 
and a person is not generally anxious about privacy, why would a person not want to 
provide the exact date of their birth (or why would a designer not want to be responsible 
for protecting it)? Because it has been demonstrated that extremely detailed information 
such as birth date, especially when combined with other similarly specific data, can be 
used to individually identify a person. Acquisti & Gross (2009) demonstrated that 
information about an individual’s date of birth, combined with birth location information 
was enough to predict the individual’s Social Security Number (which can then be used 
for identity theft). Similar previous research demonstrated that analogous attacks 
including re-identification by linking could be used with large databases of ostensibly 
anonymized data to identify individuals (Sweeny, 2002). 
 
 
 87   
Vague Input 
As an alternative to asking people to provide their exact date of birth, I propose 
“vague input” (Figure 11). In this alternative input design, users are asked to provide their 
age group, rather than their exact date of birth. This is preferable from a privacy 
perspective because information at the group level is less susceptible to an attack as 
described by Acquisti & Gross (2009) and Sweeny (2002) without requiring 
anonymization (at least with respect to age data).  
  
Figure 11. Alternative "Vague" Age Input 
 
As an additional justification, information such as age is often binned for analysis 
anyway. In most circumstances it is unnecessary to know the exact date of an individual’s 
birth; rather, what is desired is a general idea of the person’s age group. For example, 
take the example of health screenings. In this case, the information a health care 
practitioner requires for determining the appropriate health screenings is age group and 
gender, not date of birth. Cholesterol screenings are recommended for men over 30, not 
for people born on April 15th. Vague inputs, inspired by an everyday privacy behavior as 
described by participants, limits the privacy consequences of disclosing personal 
information, while preserving useful information. 
Clearly there will be some instances where an actual birth date is required. For 
example, a birthday reminder will not be functional without knowing an exact birth date. 
However, in this case, an input for birth year is unnecessary.  This suggests a higher level 
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design implication: designers should ask only for the amount of information that is 
necessary. The criteria for determining what level of information that is necessary should 
include a careful consideration of 1) what the data will be used for and 2) what the 
potential harm of having more detailed information might be. In the case of exact age 
information, the harm could be great (e.g., Acquisti & Gross, 2009). 
Summary and Interim Conclusion 
In this study I examined everyday privacy behaviors as described by participants. 
The purpose of the focus group study was to gain a better understanding of existing 
privacy behaviors. In particular, a goal of this study was to categorize reported privacy 
behaviors across multiple circumstances and technologies to identify common themes. 
The results of this study suggest that common privacy behaviors exist across technologies 
and that these behaviors may be supported by alternative designs.  Behaviors grouped 
into one of three categories: avoidance, modification, and alleviation. Within each of 
these high level groups, sub-behaviors were also identified and described. The groups of 
everyday privacy behaviors identified in this study suggest an alternative to the claim that 
privacy is too contextual a topic to understand at a psychological level. Instead, I 
demonstrated that there are commonalities in reported privacy behaviors across contexts. 
I then suggested that these commonalities and the resulting classification provide 
a way to organize many of the previous findings in privacy and HCI. I also contrasted the 
everyday privacy behaviors identified in this study to Altman’s privacy regulation 
mechanisms and showed how the alternative grouping proposed here may be useful to 
designers. Then I discussed the findings of this study in relation to Altman’s model of 
privacy regulation and argued that Altman’s model does not reflect users’ discussion of 
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their privacy behaviors. Next, based on this study, I proposed an alternative model of 
privacy regulation. Finally, I demonstrated how the descriptions of everyday privacy 
behavior may be used to inspire privacy preserving designs. One overall implication of 
the findings is that for technologies to effectively support privacy, they need to support 
the kind of nuanced disclosure that people want. One part of supporting nuanced 
disclosure is to ensure that the disclosure is error-free. In the following chapters I address 
disclosure errors. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHOD FOR STUDY 2 – CRITICAL MISCLOSURE INCIDENTS 
 
A misclosure is the unintentional revealing of personal information to others 
while using a technology. A critical incident technique was used to examine the type, 
nature, and conditions surrounding previous instances of misclosure.  
Critical Incident Technique 
The critical incident technique (CIT) is “a set of procedures for collecting direct 
observations of human behavior in such a way as to facilitate their potential usefulness in 
solving practical problems and developing broad psychological principles” (Flanagan, 
1954, p. 327). Originally, the critical incident method was developed to identify critical 
requirements for job fit. Using this method, Flanagan (1954) identified the characteristics 
of a person that made them particularly appropriate for performing a specific job (e.g., 
the critical requirements for an airline pilot). Since its inception, the method has also been 
used to identify the problems of a system, areas for improvement of a system, and has 
more recently been expanded to include the identification of vulnerable areas of a system 
that may cause problems in the future (Schulter, Seaton & Chaboyer, 2007, p. 107). In 
this dissertation, I used the critical incident method to explore privacy-related problems 
across multiple systems and identify vulnerable areas of systems that may cause system 
usage errors in the future. 
The unique methodological contribution of the critical incident technique is that 
not all incidents related to a topic of interest are collected. Rather, only those incidents 
that are deemed to have special significance are gathered and analyzed, resulting in more 
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efficient and effective research. The rationale for collecting only those incidents deemed 
to have special significance is twofold. First, atypical events are more easily recalled; 
multiple studies demonstrate that there is a bias to report dramatic or special types of 
events over mundane, frequently occurring events. While often considered a flaw in 
traditional methods of retrospective report, this feature of memory is exploited in the 
critical incident method. Therefore, many of the criticisms of traditional retrospective 
reports (e.g., that participants will not correctly remember or may only report highly 
salient events) are allayed. Second, these atypical events are by nature infrequent and 
occur unpredictably. Thus, despite the importance of these events, they are often difficult 
to observe as they occurring. However, by applying the critical incident technique these 
barriers can be overcome. 
Steps in a Critical Incident Study 
There are five high-level steps in a critical incident study: identify aims, identify 
type of events to collect, collect data, analyze data, and disseminate results. Because 
many of these steps are analogous to steps in other methods, only those points where 
differences exist between this and other, more familiar, methods will be discussed. 
The first step, identify aims, includes determining what is necessary if the results 
of an action are judged to be successful or effective. In some cases (e.g., a job-related 
task) a supervisor determines how to judge success and therefore the aim. However, in 
the case of this study, users determined the aim of their actions, thus had to supply the 
criteria for success or failure. In this study, the critical aims were gleaned from a review 
of the literature as well as preliminary archival analysis of the focus group discussion. A 
primary aim that was repeatedly mentioned in both the literature as well as the focus 
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group data was misclosure prevention; that is, retaining privacy involves disclosing 
information to some, while keeping it from others. 
The second step in a critical incident study is to identify the types of events to 
collect. According to Flanagan (1954, p. 338), critical incidents are, “extreme behavior, 
either outstandingly effective or ineffective with respect to attaining the general aims of 
the activity.” Because the focus was on misclosures rather than disclosures, for this study 
I gathered outstandingly ineffective behaviors, or those which eventually led to a 
misclosure instance. As a further specification, because I am interested in understanding 
privacy and technology, only misclosure incidents when a technology is involved were 
collected. 
The third step in a critical incident study is to collect the data. Data for critical 
incident studies may be collected in many ways including questionnaires (anonymous, 
mail, or email), interview (individual, phone, online, or group), by directly observing 
critical incidents, or by examining written records. In this study, I collected data through 
the use of a structured interview. A structured interview is a survey technique used to 
reliably gather data on a specific topic in a manner that preserves question order across 
participants. It is similar to a questionnaire but is administered orally instead of in written 
form. One of the reasons to choose a structured interview over a questionnaire is because 
of increased data quality. A skilled interviewer is expected to elicit accurate behavioral 
descriptions from participants by encouraging participants to provide specific, veridical 
descriptions. In addition, an interviewer may be able to answer questions participants 
may have during the course of the study. 
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A reason to choose a structured interview over an unstructured interview is to 
ensure that all participants receive the same questions in the same order. This 
standardization serves two purposes. First, it ensures that data can be compared across 
groups (e.g., younger vs. older adults) because it minimizes order effects. For example, if 
in using an unstructured interview all older adults happened to discus the person or 
people they misclosed to first, yet younger adults spoke about the technology first, it 
would be difficult to compare the aggregated responses at the group level because of 
context effects. Second, data obtained from a structured interview are easier to analyze 
because the categories of responses are often known in advance (i.e., flexible closed 
ended) and because the answer to each specific question is identifiable. In an unstructured 
interview each participant will explain examples in a unique way. For example a 
participant may begin talking about misclosure example A. While talking about 
misclosure example A, they may be reminded of misclosure example B and begin talking 
about that example before fully explaining misclosure example A. Despite coding with 
the surrounding contextual transcript, it is often difficult to follow a participant’s 
sequence of description through coding. 
The fourth and fifth steps are analyze the data and disseminate findings. Because 
these steps are not unique to the critical incident method they will not be described in 
detail here. Flanagan maintains that the purpose of data analysis is to make the findings 
easier to report while pointing out that dissemination of findings includes interpreting the 
analyzed data and providing this information in the form of a report. 
 
 
 94   
Overview of Study 
Participants were asked to recall specific, relevant events and relate these to the 
interviewer. In addition to the event, participants were also asked to report the conditions 
surrounding each misclosure, including cognitive/psychological factors such as attention 
(e.g., attentional demands, whether attention was divided), noise conditions, working 
memory demands, and social demands. Each incidence of misclosure was coded along 
the dimensions of information type, system type, cognitive factors, and type of 
misclosure. The precise point of error during the disclosure process as well as relevant 
psychological characteristics were identified, thus providing a psychological basis for 
design suggestions for improving privacy in technology which is grounded in empirical 
findings. 
Participants 
Because participants must have had an opportunity to experience a misclosure 
(i.e., used technology where a misclosure could have occurred), only those participants 
who had experience with technology were recruited. Since younger adults were Georgia 
Tech undergraduates, it was assumed they had experience with technology and this was 
confirmed via a technology experience questionnaire. Older adults were screened for 
medium to high communication technology experience, defined as, at minimum, reported 
use of cell phone and email, prior to recruitment.  
Participants were 30 older adults (14 female) between the ages of 66 and 79 (M = 
72.43, SD = 3.70) and 27 younger adults (14 female) between the ages of 18 and 23 (M = 
20.22, SD = 1.45). Older adult participants were recruited from a database of people that 
had previously expressed interest in participating in studies in the Human Factors and 
Aging Lab. Younger adult participants were recruited from the Psychology Subject Pool 
via experimetrix at Georgia Tech. 
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As shown in Table 18 participants were well educated and diverse in terms of 
ethnicity. Participants were fluent English speakers. Younger adults received class credit 
for participation whereas older adult participants were remunerated for their time at a rate 
of $25 for the 1 – 2 hour study. Approval for the study was given by the Georgia Institute 
of Technology Institutional Review Board.  
Table 18. Misclosure Sample Description 
 Younger 
Adults 
(N = 27) 
Older 
 Adults 
(N = 30) 
Age: M (SD) 20.22 (1.45) 72.43 (3.70) 
Gender: % (N)   
   Male 48% (13) 53% (16) 
   Female 52% (14) 47% (14) 
Education: % (N)   
   ≤ High school 19% (5) 13% (4) 
   Vocational training, some college,   
   Associate’s degree 
70% (19) 7% (2) 
   Bachelor’s, Master’s Doctoral    
   Degree 
11% (3) 80% (24) 
Ethnicity: % (N)   
   Hispanic 4% (1) 3% (1) 
   Non-Hispanic White 67% (18) 80% (24) 
   Non-Hispanic Black 0% (0) 17% (5) 
   Other 29% (8) 0% (0) 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
As is typical in the aging literature, younger adults performed more quickly and 
more accurately on the reverse digit span and digit-symbol substitution tasks, whereas 
older adults outperformed younger adults on the Shipley vocabulary task (see Table 19). 





Reverse Digit Span: M (SD) 10.08* (2.38) 1 7.93 (2.26) 
Digit-Symbol Substitution: M (SD) 74.41* (10.43) 53.93 (12.05) 
Shipley Vocabulary: M (SD) 30.56* (4.14) 35.90 (2.89) 
* indicates significant age-related difference, p=.001 
1N=25; 2 YA participants data were not usable (because they began cheating by writing backwards) 
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Materials 
Materials for the study included multiple questionnaires, a critical incident 
questionnaire, critical incident coding worksheet and exit interview. Demographic, 
health, and technology experience questionnaires are provided in Appendix C, while the 
Critical Incident Interview (for the purposes of data collection presented with the Critical 
Incident Coding Worksheet), and Exit Interview are provided in Appendix B.  
Demographic and Health Questionnaire 
The demographic questionnaire (see Czaja et al., 2006a) gathered broad 
characteristics of the sample including age, gender, ethnicity, and work status; the health 
questionnaire gathered self-reported health status, satisfaction with health, and number of 
medical problems.  
Technology Experience Questionnaire 
The technology experience questionnaire (see Czaja et al., 2006b) gathered 
information about technology experience, usage, and attitudes. 
Critical Incident Interview 
The critical incident interview gathered information about the number and type of 
misclosure incidents, as well as the conditions surrounding each misclosure.  
Critical Incident Coding Worksheet 
The critical incident coding worksheet was designed to assist the interviewer in 
collecting data during the interview. It contained misclosure questions as well as potential 
answers (collected from pilot testing). 
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Exit Interview 
The exit interview was designed to give the participant an opportunity to express 
opinions or provide data they were not previously asked about. 
Equipment 
As a secondary method of data collection, all critical incident interviews were 
recorded using an Olympus DS-30 voice recorder. Following the interview, interviews 
were transferred to PC and converted to wav files using WinFF (open source freeware for 
file conversion) for storage and verification purposes. Audio clips were extracted using 
Audacity, an open source freeware application for sound editing.  
  
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were asked to complete the 
demographics and health and technology experience questionnaires. Next, participants 
were introduced to the goals of the study and given instructions about how to complete 
the interview. This description introduced the concept of misclosure as well as explained 
the different types of misclosure (i.e., recipient, information, and combination). Next, the 
interviewer asked the participant to take up to 5 minutes to reflect on any critical 
incidents that may have occurred and note those on a piece of paper for their own 
memory. Participants were instructed that the notes they made were for their own use and 
would not be collected by the interviewer. These memory aids were discarded at the 
conclusion of the study. 
Next, the interviewer began the critical incident questionnaire by asking the 
participant to describe the first [recipient OR information OR combination] misclosure 
incident they noted on their scratch paper. Order of type of misclosure incident asked 
about was counterbalanced using a partial latin square design. Then the interviewer 
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followed the interview script, asking all follow up questions about the misclosure 
incident. This procedure was repeated until all misclosure incidents were reported.  
If the participant reported that they had never experienced a misclosure incident, 
the interviewer provided additional examples to encourage recollection of misclosure 
incidents. If the participant still did not report having experienced a misclosure incident, 
the participant was asked follow up open-ended questions that addressed their opinions 
about why they thought they had never experienced a misclosure. Finally, participants 
were thanked for their time and the session was concluded. 
After all critical incidents were gathered participants were debriefed, remunerated 
via check or experimetrix credit and thanked for their participation in the study. A 
















5 Minute Self-Reflection 
(recall misclosure incidents; 
note on sheet) 
“Tell me about 






“Did any other incidents 






“Is there anything else you 
would like to tell me about 
any of the incidents we’ve 
discussed today?” 
Figure 12. Critical Incident Study Procedure
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Data Analysis Strategy 
Because the critical incident questionnaire was highly structured, and because the 
critical incident coding worksheet was used during the interview, a large amount of 
coding was completed in real time. That is, as the interview was being conducted the 
interviewer marked tallies into pre-defined categories on the worksheet, similar to the 
way data collection is completed in a questionnaire. 
In addition to marking tallies into pre-defined categories, the interviewer also took 
notes about comments that were related to the aim of the study, but not captured on the 
worksheet, thus providing flexibility not offered by the use of a traditional questionnaire. 
These notes provided an additional reference if the codes on the code worksheet were 
ambiguous. Data from participants who were unable to produce any critical incidents 
were replaced up to the proposed N. 
T-tests and Pearson Chi-square tests were used to determine the significance of 
relationships between variables of interest. In Chi-square tests residuals (the difference 
between the observed frequency and the expected frequency) were converted to z-scores 
and compared to a critical value corresponding to an alpha of 0.05 (i.e., +/- 1.96) to 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS OF STUDY 2: CRITICAL MISCLOSURE INCIDENTS 
 
Most participants (100% of younger; N = 27 and 83%; N = 30 of older) reported 
at least one misclosure incident (see Figure 13Error! Reference source not found.). 
Whereas all younger adult participants reported at least 1 misclosure incident, 5 older 
adult participants reported 0 misclosure incidents. 
 
Figure 13. Percentage of Participants Reporting Misclosure 
 
Number of Misclosures Reported 
An independent samples t test was performed comparing the mean number of 
misclosure incidents reported by all (both those reporting 0 misclosures and those 
reporting more than 0) older adults (M = 2.50, SD = 1.89) with the mean number of 
















 101   
analysis strategy there was a significant difference in the number of misclosure incidents 
reported by older adults and the number of incidents reported by younger adults t(55) = 
2.7, p = 0.01. 
A second independent samples t-test was performed comparing the mean number 
of misclosure incidents reported by older adults who reported at least one misclosure  (M 
= 3.00, SD = 1.66) with the mean number of misclosure incidents reported by younger 
adults (all of whom reported at least one misclosure, M = 3.70, SD = 1.41). Using this 
analysis strategy there was not a significant difference in the number of misclosure 
incidents reported by older adults and the number of incidents reported by younger adults 
t(50) = 1.65, p = .11. Older and younger adults reported just over 3 misclosure incidents 
per person. 
For the remainder of the results sections participants reporting no misclosure 
incidents (N=5; all older adults) will be excluded from analysis (resulting in final N=52). 
Type of Incidents Reported 
In addition to specific misclosure incidents, participants also reported: non-
specific incidents (i.e., incidents where participants could remember a misclosure 
happening multiple times but were unable to recall details about a specific incident), 
times when they were the recipient of a misclosure, and near misses. These incidents 
were collected but were not analyzed for the purposes of this study. All data presented 
from this point forward come from reports of specific misclosure incidents. 
Misclosure Type 
Participants reported information, recipient and combination misclosures. There 
was a significant relationship between age group and the type of misclosure most 
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commonly reported 2(2, N = 159) = 15.76, p = .001. Younger adults reported more 
information misclosures whereas older adults reported more recipient misclosures (’s < 
.05; see Table 20). The number of combination misclosures did not differ across age 
group.  
 







Information* 61% 32% 
Recipient* 33% 65% 
Combination 6% 3% 
*p< .05 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
 
Length of Time since Incident 
For both younger and older adults the majority (~60%) of misclosure incidents 
reported occurred within the six months prior to the interview (see Table 21). Younger 
adults reported very few incidents occurring more than five years prior to the interview 
while 15% of the incidents older adults reported were from more than five years prior to 
the interview.  







< 1 month 19% 27% 
1 – 6 months 47% 31% 
7 – 12 months 10% 15% 
1-5 years 19% 13% 
> 5 years 3% 15% 
Do not recall 1% 0% 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
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Type of System 
Misclosures occurred across a number of different technologies (see Table 22). 
For both younger and older adults, misclosure occurrences most often occurred while the 
participant was using an email system. Younger adults also reported misclosures while 
using instant messaging, text messaging and social networking. Older adults on the other 
hand reported misclosures while shopping online and while using a landline telephone.  
 





Email 39% 52% 
cell phone 3% 15% 
instant messaging 13% 0% 
text messaging 13% 0% 
online social network (e.g., 
facebook) 
12% 2% 
online shopping 3% 10% 
Combination 1% 4% 
Fax 1% 2% 
landline phone 2% 6% 
Blog 3% 2% 
online project management 3% 0% 
Other 6% 9% 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
 
Experience with System 
Participants were asked to estimate how long they had been using each system at 
the time each misclosure incident occurred. The majority of incidents were associated 
with systems that participants had been using for over six months (see Table 23).  
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< 1 month 7% - 
1 – 6 months 12% 3% 
7 – 12 months 14% 2% 
1-5 years 56% 65% 
> 5 years 9% 28% 
Missing 2% 3% 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
 
Familiarity 
Participants were also asked to rate their level of familiarity with each system at 
the time of each misclosure incident. In line with the results from reports of length of 
time using the system, as well as independent reports (from the technology experience 
questionnaire) of technology experience, for the majority of misclosure incidents 
participants reported that they were familiar or very familiar with the system they were 
using when the misclosure occurred (see Figure 14). 
Figure 14. Familiarity with System 
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Attribution of Error 
Overall, participants reported that most of the time misclosure errors were their 
fault rather than the fault of the technology. There was a significant relationship between 
age group and the attribution of error 2(3, N = 159) = 14.00, p = .001. Misclosures by 
older adults who blamed themselves were overrepresented, whereas misclosures by 
younger adults who blamed both (the technology and themselves) were overrepresented 
(’s < .05; see Table 24). The number of misclosures blamed on the technology did not 
differ across age groups. Older adults blamed themselves more often than younger adults, 
whereas younger adults blamed both the technology and themselves more often than 
younger adults.  





Technology 4% 9% 
Self* 56% 77% 
Both* 39% 12% 




Regardless of the answer to the forced choice attribution of blame question, 
participants were asked whether there were any system factors that contributed to the 
misclosure. In line with the results of the question about error attribution, older adults 
reported that for the majority of misclosure instances (63%) there were no system factors 
that contributed to the misclosure. However, younger adults reported that there were no 
system factors that contributed to a misclosure instance in only 33% of the cases. 
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If participants stated that there were system factors that contributed to the error, 
they were asked to describe each contributing factor (note that people were allowed to 
report more than one factor contributing to each misclosure). System factors that 
contributed to misclosure occurrences include lack familiarity, general interface issues 
making a technology difficult to use, auto fill and predictive text features, visual 
similarity of system features with different functions, interface button proximity for 
action and/or recipient selection, reply all features, recipient and file name truncation, 
automatic focus or cursor changes, lack of clarity with respect to request or recipient, 
difficult sharing/privacy settings and no warning or feedback provided by the system (see 
Table 25).  
 





Lack of familiarity 7% 0% 
Hard to use/general interface 15% 4% 
Auto-fill/predictive text features 7% 11% 
Visual similarity of system features with different functions 11% 7% 
Interface/button proximity for action 9% 15% 
Interface/button proximity for recipient selection 15% 11% 
Reply all feature not obvious 3% 4% 
name of recipient truncated by system 1% 0% 
name of file/information truncated by system 7% 4% 
Focus/cursor changes automatically 7% 7% 
Request or recipient unclear 1% 26% 
Sharing/privacy settings difficult  8% 4% 
No warning and/or feedback 7% 4% 
Self issues attributed to technology 3% 4% 
Note: Percentages were rounded; percentage of misclosures where system factors were 
reported to have contributed to the misclosure. 
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Person Factors 
Participants were also asked whether there were any things that they did (i.e., self 
factors) that contributed to the misclosure. Both younger and older adults reported that in 
a large majority of misclosures (95% and 94% respectively) they had done something 
that contributed to the misclosure event.  When participants stated that there were self 
factors that contributed to the error, they were asked to describe each contributing factor. 
Self factors that contributed to misclosure occurrences include not paying attention, 
carelessness, not double checking, being in a hurry, and pressing the wrong button (See 
Table 26). 





Not paying attention 20% 19% 
Carelessness 18% 11% 
Did not double check 16% 8% 
In a hurry 7% 12% 
Hit wrong button 7% 11% 
Multitasking/concurrent activities 2% 3% 
Lack of familiarity 2% 0% 
Distracted by surroundings 2% 2% 
Distracted by state of mind 4% 2% 
File names too similar 8% 3% 
Old habit or rule applied 2% 7% 
Should have known better 2% 6% 
Misspelled, misread, etc. 4% 4% 
Lack of awareness 4% 3% 
Poor health/ability 1% 4% 
Failed to logout 2% 0% 
Don't remember 1% 1% 
Tried to take a short cut 1% 1% 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
 
Negative Consequences 
Participants were asked whether there were any negative consequences associated 
with each misclosure. For the most part, participants reported that there were not negative 
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consequences (see Table 27). However in 29% of the cases for younger adults and 43% 
of the cases for older adults, participants reported that there were negative consequences. 
Negative consequences included embarrassment, having to apologize, annoyance, feeling 
“stupid”, having to cancel a credit card, and having to expend effort to correct the error. 





Yes 29% 43% 
No 70% 57% 
missing/other 1% 2% 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
 
Repeat Occurrences 
Participants were asked whether, following an initial misclosure, they experienced 
another similar misclosure. Participants reported that in about 40% of misclosures they 
had experienced another similar misclosure after the initial misclosure incident (see Table 
28). 





Yes 43% 41% 
No 57% 54% 
missing/other - 4% 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
 
Steps Taken to Prevent Future Occurrences 
Participants were asked whether, after a misclosure occurrence, they had taken 
any steps to ensure that a similar event did not take place in the future. In about three 
quarters of the cases participants reported that they had taken steps to prevent future 
misclosure occurrences (see Table 29).  
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Yes 73% 77% 
No 28% 24% 
Note: Percentages were rounded. 
 
When participants reported that they had taken steps to prevent future misclosure 
occurrences, they were asked to describe these steps in more detail. Participants reported 
that they tried to be more careful, double check, pay more attention, use a system less, 
avoid using a system when distracted, corrected information, tried to be more organized, 
set more restrictive sharing settings and practiced using a system to try to  prevent future 
misclosure occurrences (see Table 30). In the following chapter I discuss the results 
presented here. 





Tried to be more careful 29% 44% 
Always double check 33% 16% 
Pay more attention 15% 14% 
Used system/committed action less 7% 8% 
Less use when distracted 1% 11% 
Corrected or erased particular case 8% 2% 
Better organizing or planning actions 1% 5% 
More restrictive privacy settings 4% 0% 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION OF CRITICAL MISCLOSURE INCIDENT RESULTS 
 
This study was designed to collect information about critical misclosure incidents. 
In this study I recorded and counted the number of misclosure occurrences each 
participant reported, categorized each misclosure incident in terms of type of misclosure 
(i.e., recipient misclosure, information misclosure, or combination misclosure), and 
gathered information on the conditions surrounding each misclosure occurrence. 
 Misclosures were reported by most participants, had occurred recently, and 
occurred even with systems participants were familiar with and often had been using for a 
year or more. The types of incidents gathered covered multiple technologies including 
email, social networking, cell phones (including texting), and many others. There were no 
age differences in the number of misclosures reported by younger and older adults, 
however, there were age differences in how older and younger attributed the blame for 
misclosure errors.   
The remainder of the discussion is organized as follows: First I discuss the 
general results of the study. Then I discuss how these results suggest a) design 
considerations b) a focus on social wysiwyg and c) implications for theory. 
On average, participants (both younger and older) reported 3 misclosure 
occurrences each. This suggests that misclosure incidents are memorable events, perhaps 
because of their significance. Usually these misclosures had occurred within the last year. 
One way to restate this is that people may experience about 3 misclosures annually. In 
addition, it appears that most people have experienced a misclosure at least once; only 5 
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participants in the entire study did not report any misclosures. In combination, these 
numbers suggest that misclosures are a potential threat to the privacy of many users.   
In terms of type of misclosure, younger adults reported more information 
misclosures, whereas older adults reported more recipient misclosures. Judging by the 
types of systems used where older adults experienced the most misclosures, it may be 
that those technologies (e.g., email and cell phone) are more prone to recipient 
misclosures, whereas technologies that were reported by younger adults almost 
exclusively (e.g., instant messaging, text messaging, and social networking) are more 
prone to information misclosures. As expected, combination misclosures (which combine 
a recipient and information misclosure) were reported with the least frequency across age 
groups. 
Misclosures occurred while participants were using a variety of systems, 
including: email, cell phone, instant messaging, text messaging, online social networking 
(e.g., facebook), online shopping, fax, landline phone, blog, and online project 
management software. That misclosures occurred across such a wide variety of systems 
indicates that misclosures are a widespread issue that should be addressed for multiple 
technologies. 
The majority of misclosure incidents reported resulted from interactions with 
technologies the participants were experienced with using at the time of the incident (e.g., 
cell phone, email) rather than when a participant was using a new system that he or she 
was not familiar with. More than half the time, participants had at least one year of 
experience using the system when the misclosure occurred. This suggests that the 
likelihood of misclosure may not be mitigated by time using a system. It is also worth 
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noting that because certain technologies are used more often they provide more 
opportunities for misclosure. 
Besides having experience with a system, participants also reported that they were 
familiar with the system they were using when they experienced a misclosure. Well over 
half of the time, participants reported being very familiar with a system when a 
misclosure occurred. This indicates that misclosures occur even on systems with which 
participants are highly familiar and buttresses the previous suggestion that the likelihood 
of a misclosure may not be mitigated by familiarity with a system.  
That misclosures occur on systems that users have been using for a relatively long 
time and rate themselves as very familiar may seem surprising. However, Reason’s 
(1984) theory of errors suggests that when encountering a familiar system, people may be 
prone to motor-sensory errors, especially given environmental demands (e.g., a 
distracting crowd or busy schedule). Thus, it is possible that some of the errors that led to 
misclosure experiences may have been motor-sensory. If this is the case, one way to 
decrease the likelihood of misclosure occurrences in the future is to focus on preventing 
motor-sensory errors.  
Both younger and older adults blamed themselves more often than the technology 
for the misclosures they experienced. However, older adults blamed themselves more 
often than younger adults, whereas younger adults often blamed errors on a combination 
of themselves and the technology. In general, the finding that both younger and older 
adults blamed themselves is surprising given that we would expect self-protective 
attributions (blame the machine) rather than self-blame. It may be that because the errors 
were social in nature participants found it harder to blame a machine for the errors.  
 113   
 When participants did express that the technology had at least some part in 
contributing to the misclosure, system factors that were mentioned included general 
interface issues making a technology difficult to use, auto fill and predictive text features, 
visual similarity of system features with different functions, interface button proximity 
for action and/or recipient selection, reply all features, recipient and file name truncation, 
automatic focus or cursor changes, lack of clarity with respect to request or recipient, 
difficult sharing/privacy settings and no warning or feedback provided by the system. 
Participants also reported “lack of familiarity” as a system factor that contributed to their 
misclosure experience. This is notable because participants are blaming the system for 
their own lack of familiarity, indicating that participants may feel it is the system’s 
responsibility to be easy to use and thus seem familiar. 
Participants also reported that they contributed to misclosure occurrences. For 
example, participants reported that they contributed to misclosure occurrences by not 
paying attention, being careless, not double checking, being in a hurry, and pressing the 
wrong button. From a human factors perspective, many of these “contributions to an 
error” may be due to poor design, rather than to “not paying attention” or “being 
careless”. Systems should be designed so that users do not have to take additional steps to 
prevent misclosure, rather this should be the default state.  
When misclosures did occur, they sometimes resulted in negative consequences. 
For example, participants reported that they were embarrassed, had to apologize and “felt 
stupid” after misclosure occurrences. This suggests that misclosures may negatively 
affect a person’s well being. Perhaps because of these negative consequences, a majority 
of participants (about ¾) reported that they had taken steps including trying to be more 
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careful, double checking, paying more attention, using a system less, and changed their 
usage habits to try to prevent future misclosure occurrences. Despite these attempts, in 
about 40% of the misclosures reported, participants reported that a similar misclosure had 
occurred after the first incident. This indicates that despite additional effort, participants 
may not have been able to prevent future misclosures and suggests that design 
alternatives may be in need. 
Design Implications 
Some implications for design may be drawn directly from the system factors that 
participants reported contributed to the misclosures. For example, participants mentioned 
that the reply/all feature on some systems is not obvious. There are at least two ways to 
deal with this issue from a design standpoint. One way to address this is to make the fact 
that a user is replying to multiple people visually salient. A design that already 
accomplishes this, but is not in widespread use is called facemail (Lieberman & Miller, 
2007; see Figure 15). In this email client, pictures of selected recipients are automatically 
displayed in a peripheral display while a user is composing an email message. Findings 
from studies of facemail indicated that the peripheral display of faces improves users 
ability to detect a potential misclosure (in this case, misdirected email). 
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Figure 15. Example similar to Facemail 
 
A second way to address the issue of sending a message to unintended recipients 
is to implement an undo function.  In the context of email, this could be in the form of a 
“recall” function. Despite technical challenges inherent in providing email recall, some 
email providers are already offering such an option, albeit a limited one. Google offers 
gmail users 5 seconds to “undo” sending an email once the user has clicked “send” (see 
Figure 16). If a user realizes that they have accidentally sent an email to the wrong person 
or to too many people within this time period, they are able to click undo and recall the 
email before it arrives in another person’s email box. One consideration related to this is 
that in some email clients a recall option is available, however the recipient continues to 
have access to the email but is suggested not to read the email. It is possible that if shown 
a notice that an email sender wants to recall the contents of an unintentionally sent email, 
the receivers may be more rather than less likely to actually read the email.  
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Figure 16. Gmail undo feature 
 
Another system factor that participants reported contributed to misclosures was 
auto-fill/predictive text. Participants’ reported that systems would often guess a name 
they were trying to type too soon and automatically fill in an incorrect name in a recipient 
field. While predictive text may be considered useful and a time-saver in many contexts, 
in situations where privacy is critically important, auto-fill features should be considered 
carefully. For example, in the design of an electronic medical record, a function designed 
to provide deliberate control as to the recipient may be more appropriate than an auto-fill 
system that provides quick access to multiple health care providers or other potential 
recipients. In this case, the risk of automation encouraging a misclosure may be greater 
than the benefit of a specific type of convenience (i.e., auto-fill). 
Participants also reported that misclosures occurred as a result of file and/or 
recipient information being truncated. The design implication here is obvious: increase 
the size of space available for file/recipient information viewing. A related problem 
participants mentioned was that often files shared the same “space”. That is, image files 
may share a folder with document files due to lack of organization or some other factor. 
In this case it became easy for participants to “grab” the wrong file (e.g., a photo instead 
of a document). This suggests that alternative file organization strategies may prevent 
some types of misclosure. Another straightforward issue is feedback. Participants 
reported that lack of a warning or feedback contributed to their misclosures. Therefore 
providing additional feedback may decrease misclosure occurrence.  
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Finally, participants reported that often misclosures occurred because 
privacy/sharing settings were difficult to understand. As an example of privacy settings 
that are confusing, examine facebook’s privacy setting page (see Figure 17). In this 
example it is difficult to tell what information is shared with whom. It is not clear what 
information is contained in “profile” and what information is contained in “basic info”. 
Also, it is not possible to see the people in each of the groups listed. Instead, a user must 
rely on memory to recall the members of each group. 
 
Figure 17. Sample facebook privacy settings 
    
Social Wysiwyg 
In combination, many of these suggestions for design constitute a need for social 
wysiwyg. Wysiwyg is an acronym for What You See Is What You Get and refers to a 
system where the output or final product appears visually similar to content that is being 
edited. I propose social wysiwyg as an analogy to wysiwyg in that social wysiwyg may 
make sharing/privacy easier in the way wysiwyg makes document editing easier. In 
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social wysiwyg the idea is that users should be given a visual representation of where (to 
whom) their information (what information) is going. Given a clear presentation about 
where and to whom information is going, users may be less likely to misclose. 
As an example of a social wysiwyg interface, I have created an interface called 
“selectiveShare”. In selectiveShare content and recipient are both displayed 
simultaneously (see Figure 18). If I wanted to share my dissertation with colleagues at 
Indiana University, I could either a) first select the content, then choose the recipients or 
b) first choose the recipients then choose the content. Either way, both recipient and 
content would be displayed at the same time and I would see a preview of what 
information was going to whom before information was transferred. 
 
Figure 18. SelectiveShare Interface Sketch 
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As with other examples, it is not suggested that selectiveShare is necessarily a 
better option than existing privacy/sharing settings. SelectiveShare is just a sketch and 
has not been tested with users. Alternative designs would need to be developed and 
usability tested before selectiveShare was implemented anywhere. Second, selectiveShare 
may not be appropriate for settings where privacy issues are not critical, as it is possible 
that it would increase the time it takes users to complete common sharing tasks. For 
example, Kieras & Bovair (1986) demonstrated that an overly simplified model may lead 
users to become frustrated with an interface or device if they are asked to interact with an 
incomplete or superficial device model rather than the actual model. However, in settings 
where privacy is very important, for example when older adults need to be able to control 
the flow of monitoring information with a caregiver, selectiveShare or something like it 
has the potential to be useful as a more usable sharing/privacy interface, especially with 
respect to preventing misclosure. 
Theoretical Implications 
Although it is difficult to draw predictions from Altman’s model of privacy 
regulation (Caine, 2008), there is one area where it is possible to pit Altman’s model 
against the alternative model proposed in this dissertation. Altman’s model of privacy 
regulation suggests that people manage privacy through a personal boundary regulation 
process where they may be more open (more receptive to disclosing) or more closed (less 
likely to disclose). Given this model of privacy we would have expected to observe more 
combination misclosures where unintended information went to an unintended person 
because the model suggests that information is either kept inside the boundary or let outside 
the boundary rather than aimed at a specific entity. In the alternative model of privacy 
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proposed in this dissertation, on the other hand, privacy is maintained when the intended 
recipient receives intended information. Therefore, based on this model, we would expect 
more information and recipient misclosures than combination misclosures. Indeed, 
participants did report more information and recipient misclosures than combination 
misclosures. 
  




The goal of this dissertation was to gain a better understanding of the 
psychological aspects of privacy in HCI. To accomplish this goal I used two 
complementary methods. First, I conducted a broad investigation of younger and older 
adults reported privacy behaviors. The results of this study include the identification and 
categorization of privacy behaviors across multiple technologies. Three broad categories 
of behavior emerged from the data: avoidance, modification, and alleviation. These 
categories of behaviors and the sub-categories of behaviors call in to question existing 
theories of privacy and suggest designs that may improve user privacy. 
In the second study I proposed misclosure as a framework for understanding some 
of the human factors issue associated with privacy in HCI. As part of this study, I 
examined misclosure occurrences to gain an understanding of the system and 
psychological conditions under which misclosures are likely to occur. This examination 
resulted in a number of recommendations about how to support privacy by preventing 
misclosure. 
In the following section I provide a discussion of some of the limitations of the 
studies presented in this dissertation. Next, I discuss some of the future work that is 
suggested by the results of the dissertation. Following this discussion, I conclude by 
providing a summary of the dissertation findings and implications. 
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Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations. First, the sample may be better educated 
and more experienced with technology than the average population. Second, the 
exploratory nature of the studies calls for caution in drawing conclusions. In particular, it 
is critical to remember that all data reported here was self-report in nature. Each of these 
concerns is discussed in more detail below.     
The sample in this study may not be representative of younger or older adults 
living in the US. With respect to younger adults, participants in our study are better 
educated and have more technology experience than average younger adults. With 
respect to older adults, as with other samples reported in the aging literature, the sample 
in this study was healthier and better educated than the average older adult. Thus, the 
results of these studies may not generalize to the population as a whole.  
However, because of the direction of the differences, we may be able to 
generalize with caution. The older adult participants in this sample had more experience 
with technology and were better educated than an average older adult, and the younger 
adult participants had more technology experience than the average younger adult. Thus, 
participants in our sample should arguably be less likely to experience misclosure 
incidents, if we expect that either intelligence or technology experience decrease the 
likelihood of misclosure. On the other hand, if misclosures are simply a function of how 
often a person uses technology, then the sample in this study may have reported more 
misclosures than we would likely see in the population as a whole. Either way it is 
unlikely that the reasons for misclosure occurrences are unrepresentative. 
Second, the studies presented in this dissertation were exploratory in nature. Thus, 
none of the design suggestions (e.g., vague design) presented in this dissertation have 
been tested with users. Although there is perhaps good reason to hypothesize that many 
 123   
of the design suggestions will improve the overall privacy usability of some systems, 
further testing is needed to evaluate these hypotheses.  
Additionally, although participants in the focus groups were introduced to a wide 
variety of systems, not all potential privacy invasive situations were discussed. In the 
scenarios, the choice was made to focus on areas that had been highlighted from previous 
research on privacy in HCI.  Therefore, technologies that have not received much 
attention in the past, were not represented here. 
Finally, this study is subject to the many drawbacks of self-report data. One of the 
drawbacks is reliance on memory. It may be the case that participants recalled more 
avoidance behaviors than modification or alleviatory behaviors and therefore reported 
them more often. Although I analyzed the results of the focus groups quantitatively, it is 
important to remember the nature of these data. The data from the focus group came from 
open-ended discussions. Behaviors that were coded were discussed freely by participants. 
A more appropriate way to determine quantitative differences in the number of actual 
privacy behaviors people engage in would be to ask participants direct questions querying 
the frequency of such behaviors in the past, or observe participants’ actual behavior.  In 
the future, studies using alternative methods that are less susceptible to issues of self-
report (e.g., direct observation, diary study, experimentation) should be conducted to test 
the conclusions presented here. 
One clear example of a limitation of self-report in this study is in the lack of 
reports of lying behavior. Although I did not return to the data to do an explicit search for 
lying behaviors, it was not a category of behaviors that emerged during coding. 
Participants may have considered lying behaviors socially inappropriate and therefore not 
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reported them during the focus group sessions. Deceptive behaviors have been observed 
in other related research (e.g., Hancock, Birnholtz, Bazarova, Guillory, Perlin & Amos, 
2009; Hancock, Toma, & Ellison, 2007). A future study could examine this in more 
detail. 
Another interesting question, if not limitation, is related to which of these types of 
behaviors is the most successful at preserving privacy. Based on the results from these 
studies it is not possible to tease apart which behaviors are most beneficial to users in 
terms of privacy management.  If we knew this we would be able to focus our design 
efforts on technologies that were not only most often mentioned by people but were also 
most effective at achieving this goal. 
Future Work 
Clearly the two studies presented here represent the beginning of much future 
work, rather than a definitive study concluding that an area is now well understood. One 
area for future research is in testing the designs suggested from the focus group work. For 
example, based on the evidence suggesting that participants rarely reported avoidance 
behaviors with respect to photo sharing, I suggested that one design alternative would be 
to consider designs that supported avoidance behaviors. Specifically, I suggested that an 
avoidance-enhancing camera could be designed that requests approval from the person in 
the photo before a photo is shared with others and further suggested that this alternative 
model of ownership may enhance a person’s sense of privacy. To test whether this design 
enhanced a person’s sense of privacy, a study could be designed such that participants are 
shown a demonstration of a camera that utilizes avoidance-enhancing technology as well 
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as a standard digital camera and then asked to rate which technology is more privacy-
preserving. 
Another example for future research is to further investigate vague design. It will 
be informative to consider how this design idea can be extended to other types of 
information. Additional questions include: Will people report that vague designs are more 
privacy protective? Will designers be able to adapt their input designs to vague designs? 
Can tools be designed to assist designers in adjusting input designs? Compared to other 
anonymization strategies, how effective is vague design? 
In terms of misclosure, there are multiple avenues for future research. A first step 
will be to conduct a study of misclosures as they happen, rather than rely on self-report 
behavior. For example, a diary study could be used to gather data about misclosures as 
they occur. Another type of study that could be conducted is experimental. Now that we 
have some idea about the types of interface characteristics that are associated with 
misclosure, these could be manipulated experimentally and the resulting misclosures 
could be recorded. This type of study would provide solid evidence about which design 
features are associated with misclosure. 
 
Final Summary 
The purpose of this research was to investigate privacy issues associated with the 
use of technology. Two studies were designed to explore different aspects of the privacy 
issues of technology. The goal of the first study was to broadly examine privacy 
behaviors as they relate to current technologies. This investigation resulted in a 
categorization of privacy behaviors associated with technology and furthered our 
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understanding about the psychological underpinnings of privacy concerns. The goal of 
the second study was to analyze a specific human factors issue thought to threaten 
privacy: disclosure error. This investigation resulted in a systematic exploration of 
unintentional disclosure errors made while using technology. 
In this dissertation I identified privacy behaviors across a broad swath of 
technologies. By analyzing reported privacy behaviors and errors, this research 
constitutes an attempt to systematically examine privacy in the context of technological 
mediated environments. The empirical investigation revealed that there are 
commonalities among privacy behaviors and suggests that these commonalities may be 
exploited by designers to increase the privacy features in their designs. Because this study 
was focused on gaining a better understand of the way users view privacy, it is not 
specific to one set of technologies.   
While some of the design suggestions may seem “obvious” or “simple”, I argue 
that they are only deceptively so. It is worth pointing out that designers struggle daily 
with developing privacy-sensitive technologies and how to prevent “data leakage”. Many 
complex security measures have been developed explicitly to deal with just one of the 
problems that a design solution was proposed for in this paper (i.e., k-anonymity vs. 
“vague input”). 
Some design alternatives inspired by findings from these studies have been 
suggested. However, an additional contribution of this paper is in describing users’ 
privacy behaviors so that other designers may be able to better understand privacy from a 
user perspective. It is my hope designers will be able to take what I have described here 
and generate many design alternatives.  
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The results from these studies study advance our understanding of users’ 
everyday privacy behaviors and the errors that occur when users are managing their 
privacy. Previous work on privacy in HCI had not focused on existing privacy behaviors 
as a source of design inspiration. By examining these behaviors I was able to suggest a 
number of things for designers of privacy protective systems to consider. 
In addition, the results from this study advance our theoretical knowledge about 
privacy in HCI. The groupings of everyday privacy behaviors across technologies suggest 
an alternative to the claim that privacy is too contextual a topic to understand at the 
psychological level. The findings in this study indicate commonalities do exist and that 
these commonalities may be useful in helping to organize previous findings from the 
privacy in HCI literature. In addition, the findings in this study suggest that Altman’s 
model of privacy does not reflect users’ privacy behaviors. Instead, an alternative model 
of privacy regulation is proposed that accounts for participants’ conceptualization of 
privacy and also predicts misclosures when errors in this conceptualization occur.  
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APPENDIX A 
MATERIALS FOR STUDY 1 
Privacy Focus Group Script 
 
{INFORMED CONSENT} 
I have given you two copies of the consent form, one copy is for us and the other is for your own records. 
Note that before you sign the consent forms, please make sure that you feel comfortable with 
participating today. If you decide for any reason that you are not able to participate today, let me 
know at any time. If you do not have any questions and you still wish to continue, you may sign the 
consent forms.  
{INTRODUCTION} 
Welcome, and thank you for your participation today. I would like to make a few introductions before we get 
started with the discussion. My name is Michelle and I will be leading the discussion today. Helping 
me today is Kelly – she will be writing things on the whiteboard and joining in the discussion as 
well. 
 
Today we will discuss your ideas and concerns about privacy. We will be recording the session today. 
Because we care very much about what each of you has to say, please speak up. We don’t want to 
miss anything that you have to say.  
{DISCUSSION} 
Now, we will move on to the focus group discussion. How many of you have participated in one of these 
before?  We will be treating it just like a discussion. Before we begin, you should understand that 
there are no right or wrong answers, only different experiences and opinions. Feel free to express 
your opinions, perhaps in disagreement with another group member, as these types of discussions 
enable us to learn a lot about the different kinds of opinions that people have. In doing so, however, 
please remain respectful of the other members of the group.  
 
A very important component to this type of study is confidentiality. There are two parts to this confidentiality 
that I wish to point out. First, as you read in the consent form, your name and your voice will not be 
tied to any of the data collected in this study. We will keep any information that ties you to the data 
on a password-protected computer in our lab. Secondly, we ask that anything we say in this room 
remain confidential amongst you guys. We hope that if you choose to talk about this study that you 
will not use each others names, and protect the identity of those in this room. 
 
The session will last about two and a half hours. We would ask that you please turn off or silence your cell 
phones for this session. If there is something that Kelly or I can do to make you more comfortable, 
like get you a different chair or get you something to drink, please let us know. Also, before we 
begin, if you need to use the restroom, please do so now. 
 
Ok, I’m going to turn on the tape recorder and begin recording now. 
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Discussion Questions 
1) Please introduce yourself to the group by stating your first name and where you grew 
up/hometown. 
 
2) We are here today to talk about privacy, so the first thing I would like to do is to have everyone take 
that blank piece of paper you see in front of you and write down your individual definition of privacy, 
or what it means to you. Feel free to brainstorm, but please work individually. When you are 
finished please fold the paper and put it in the envelope in front of you, and place the envelope 
under your chair or behind you. Thank you! 
 
3) Ok, so what were some of the ways people defined privacy. Kelly will keep track of all the different 
things we have to say by writing them on the easel.  
a. Would anyone like to share their definition with the group?   
b. What are some key words you associate with privacy?  What immediately pops into your 
head? 
 
4) Now I’d like you all to think of the last time you thought about privacy before today.  
a. When was the last time that privacy came to your consciousness?   
b. What were you thinking or talking about it?   
c. Would anyone like to share their story with the group? 
 
5) Group discussion (using examples that the group thought of) 
i. So what is privacy in these situations that we have just discussed?   
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Scenarios 
 
In the last section of this focus group, we are going to discuss privacy in a few different situations or 
contexts. We know that people think about privacy in many different ways: some people may have concerns 
in certain situations, and some people may not. So for each one of the scenarios we discuss, please 
express your concerns if you have some, and tell us a little bit about why that is a concern for you. If you feel 
that you do not have any concerns about the scenario, please tell us why not. If you feel that you have 
concerns other than privacy, please mention them briefly. 
 
Since we are really interested in what concerns you may have and what types of things you may do in these 
situations, please try to put yourself in the role of the scenario as best as you can.  
 
[For example, if the scenario is “You are walking in the supermarket,” and you do not have any privacy 
concerns, it is quite alright to say “I am not concerned about privacy in the supermarket,” instead of 
“Someone might be concerned with having the checkout person see what you are buying.”]  
 
Does anyone have any questions before we begin? 
 
 
1) You have a lifetime of photos you are thinking of storing on a website. 
c. Standard Probes 
i. Do you have any privacy issues or concerns with this situation? 
ii. What about this situation makes it concerning? 
iii. Why 
 
d. Additions to this scenario 
i. What if you used a scrapbook? 
ii. What about an online photo album (like Flickr, Picasa, Snapfish, etc - Only say 
these if participants ask for examples.)? 
iii. What about if they were just photos from a recent trip? 
iv. What if there were sensitive photos included in your set? 
v. What if you could pick exactly who saw the photos? 
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2) You are using your credit card to buy dinner in your favorite restaurant. When the waiter 
picks up the bill with your card in it, he takes the card in the other room for 5 minutes. 
e. Standard Probes 
i. Do you have any privacy issues or concerns with this situation? 
ii. What about this situation makes it concerning? 
iii. Why 
 
f. Additions to this scenario  
i. What if the restaurant is one that you’ve never been to before? 
ii. What about using your credit card to order takeout online? 
1. At home 
2. In a crowded place (library, work) 
3. On a network that is not yours 
iii. Sometimes when you fly you have to swipe your credit card at the airport kiosk to 
pull up the flight information. 
iv. Are there any other times when using your credit card that you think about 
privacy? 
v. Participants may say “This is something that I’ve done before and I feel confident 
that nothing will happen” or something to that effect. If so – say “Do you 








3) Health Information: You have the symptoms of an illness that have lasted for over a week. 
You call your doctor’s office and describe your symptoms to a nurse. 
g. Standard Probes 
i. Do you have any privacy issues or concerns with this situation? 
ii. What about this situation makes it concerning? 
iii. Why 
 
h. Additions to this scenario 
i. What about if you are in a crowded room? 
ii. What if your symptoms were more serious? Embarrassing? (AIDS, Mental 
Health, STDs) 
iii. What about finding information about a health issue that you have online? 
1. “Is there anything that you wouldn’t look for online?” 
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4) Location: You are using a cell phone with a locating device (such as GPS). You find out that 
there is a way for anyone in the world to find out your exact location. 
i. Standard Probes 
i. Do you have any privacy issues or concerns with this situation? 
ii. What about this situation makes it concerning? 
iii. Why 
 
j. Additions to this scenario 
i. What if your location was approximate? 
ii. Would it matter if only certain people could determine your location?  [for 
example, only those in your family’s cell phone plan] 
iii. Grocery Store 








5) Traffic Light: Atlanta is trying to crack down on traffic violations by installing traffic cameras 
on every stop light. These cameras monitor traffic and then take a snapshot of anything out 
of the ordinary, such as someone running a red light. (Red-light camera) 
k. Standard Probes 
i. Do you have any privacy issues or concerns with this situation? 
ii. What about this situation makes it concerning? 
iii. Why 
 
l. Additions to this scenario 
i. What if there were video cameras recording at all times? 
ii. What if this info was available to anyone on a certain TV channel? 
iii. What if Atlanta was going to crack down on traffic violations by placing more 
cops at intersections around town? 
iv. If participants say that there is no benefit from this – ask “What if cops needed to 
see if it was you driving your car, or if you were using your cell phone?” 
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6) Conversation: You are having a conversation with friends at home. 
m. Standard Probes 
i. Do you have any privacy issues or concerns with this situation? 
ii. What about this situation makes it concerning? 
iii. Why 
 
n. Additions to this scenario 
i. What about in another location, such as a crowded park?  Small coffee shop?  
Taxi/subway? 
ii. What about on the phone? 
iii. What about if you are discussing politics or religion? 
iv. What about if this conversation is taking place over instant messenger?  Over a 
video conference?  Or an internet forum? (“What if I asked you to give me your 












7) Having guests over? (kind of like conversation one) 
8) Overhearing someone’s cell phone conversation (kind of like having conversation one) 
9) Being emotional/sick in front of strangers 
10) Imagine you are creating a website about you 
11)  
 
Standard follow-ups for all questions: 
If off track – say, “That’s good, but the focus of this question is [repeat part of question].” 
If need additional probe – say, “Any [others, more, one else, thing else]?” 
If need explanation – say, “What do you mean?” 
If use the term ‘privacy’ or ‘private’ – say, “Can you use another word instead of ‘private’ or ‘privacy’ 
in that statement? 
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Repeat Privacy Definitions 
We have talked a lot about different privacy concerns today, so now we would like to revisit an exercise we 
did at the beginning of the focus group. I’d like you to each take the additional piece of paper in front of you 
and write out your definition of privacy. Once you are done, please fold the piece of paper and place it in the 
same envelope as before.  
 
Final questions 
So, let’s just think back over this hour and a half that we’ve been together, and try to summarize it a bit. 
1) Please sum up your thoughts about privacy into a few sentences. What is your personal take-away 
from this session? 
2) Next, please think about what everyone in the session discussed. If you were going to tell someone 
who was not here today what the important parts of the discussion were, what would you say? 
3) Have your views about privacy changed over the years? Are there circumstances that have 
changed your views? 
 
 
OK, we are finished with the discussion. Does anyone have any questions?  I am turning the tape recorder 
off now.  
 
Please complete this technology experience questionnaire. After you complete this questionnaire you are 





 135   
Credit Consent Form 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Project Title: Privacy and Technology: Folk Definitions and 
Behaviors 
Investigators: Dr. Wendy A. Rogers,  Dr. Arthur D. Fisk, 
Michelle Kwasny & Kelly Caine 
 
Research Consent Form 
 




The purpose of this form is to inform you about your rights as 
a research volunteer. Feel free to ask any questions that you 
may have about the study, what you will be asked to do, and 
so on. 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating in the study. Our 
work could not be completed without the help of volunteers. 
The purpose of this experiment is to understand privacy issues 
in general and as they relate to technology. We are doing this 
by asking about 15 older adults and about 15 younger adults 
to participate in focus group discussions about their 
perceptions of privacy. With this information, we hope to help 
inform privacy theory as well as inform designers about the 




If you decide to participate in this study, your part will involve 
taking part in a focus group with the experimenter, an 
assistant, and 5-7 other participants.  
 
It will probably take about 2-2.5 hours to complete this study. 
You are welcome to take a break at any time during the study. 
This focus group discussion will be audio-taped and your 
responses will be transcribed for later analysis. However, your 
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answers to the focus group questions will not be personally 
identifiable. There is no deception in this study and you can 




The following risks/discomforts may occur as a result of your 
participation in this study: 
 Participation in this study involves minimal risk or 
discomfort to you. The risks involved are no greater than 
those involved in daily activities such as having a long 




The following benefits to you are possible as a result of being 
in this study: 
 You are not likely to benefit substantially from 
participating in this study. However, your participation 
will help us obtain information about how adults view 
privacy. In addition, we hope that others will benefit from 
what we find in this study. 
 If you would like to receive the results of this study, 
please make sure that we have your contact information. 
 
Compensation to You 
 
You will receive 1 hour of extra credit for each hour you spend 
in the study. The time to complete the study is approximately 2-2.5 
hours, so you will receive 2-2.5 hours of extra credit. If you do not 
complete the study, you will receive credit based on the time that you 




The following procedures will be followed to keep your 
personal information confidential in this study:  The data that 
are collected about you will be kept private to the extent 
allowed by law. To protect your privacy, your records will be 
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kept under a code number rather than by name. Your records 
will be kept in locked files and only study staff will be allowed 
to look at them. Your name and any other fact that might point 
to you will not appear when results of this study are presented 
or published. The audio recordings of the focus group will be 
transcribed and your name will not be included in the 
transcription. Audio files will be permanently deleted within 
approximately 2 weeks of transcription. 
 
Confidentiality cannot be guaranteed; your personal 
information may be disclosed if required by law. This means 
that there may be rare situations that require us to release 
personal information about you, for example, in case a judge 
requires such release in a lawsuit.  
 
To make sure that this research is being carried out in the 
proper way, the Georgia Institute of Technology IRB will 
review study records. The Office of Human Research 
Protections may also look at study records. 
 
Because each individual’s data are completely confidential, we 
cannot mail your individual results. We will mail the group 
results and a summary of the conclusions once the project is 
completed. 
 
In Case of Injury/Harm: 
 
Reports of injury or reaction should be made to: 
Dr. Wendy Rogers at (404) 894-6775 or  
Dr. Arthur Fisk at (404) 894-6066 
 
Neither the Georgia Institute of Technology nor the principal 
investigator has made provision for payment of costs 
associated with any injury resulting from participation in this 
study. 
 
Research Participant Rights 
 Your participation in this study is voluntary. You do not have to 
be in this study if you do not want to be. 
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 You have the right to change your mind and leave the study at 
any time without giving any reason, and without penalty. 
 Any new information that may make you change your mind 
about being in this study will be given to you. 
 You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 You do not waive any of your legal rights by signing this 
consent form. 
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Questions about the Study or Your Rights as a Research 
Participant  
 
 If you have any questions about the study, you may contact 
the investigator at 404-385-0798 or 404-894-8344. 
 If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant, you may contact Ms. Melanie Clark, Georgia 
Institute of Technology at (404) 894-6942. 
 
 
If you sign below, it means that you have read (or have 
had read to you) the information given in this consent 





Participant Signature      
 Date 
 




If you must cancel a scheduled time to come to the lab, 
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Pay Consent Form 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Project Title: Privacy and Technology: Folk Definitions and 
Behaviors 
 
Investigators: Dr. Wendy A. Rogers,  Dr. Arthur D. Fisk, 
Michelle Kwasny & Kelly Caine 
 
Research Consent Form 
 




The purpose of this form is to inform you about your rights as 
a research volunteer. Feel free to ask any questions that you 
may have about the study, what you will be asked to do, and 
so on. 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating in the study. Our 
work could not be completed without the help of volunteers. 
The purpose of this experiment is to understand privacy issues 
in general and as they relate to technology. We are doing this 
by asking about 15 older adults and about 15 younger adults 
to participate in focus group discussions about their 
perceptions of privacy. With this information, we hope to help 
inform privacy theory as well as inform designers about the 




If you decide to participate in this study, your part will involve 
taking part in a focus group with the experimenter, an 
assistant, and 5-7 other participants.  
 
It will probably take about 2-2.5 hours to complete this study. 
You are welcome to take a break at any time during the study. 
This focus group discussion will be audio-taped and your 
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responses will be transcribed for later analysis. However, your 
answers to the focus group questions will not be personally 
identifiable. There is no deception in this study and you can 




The following risks/discomforts may occur as a result of your 
participation in this study: 
 Participation in this study involves minimal risk or 
discomfort to you. The risks involved are no greater than 
those involved in daily activities such as having a long 




The following benefits to you are possible as a result of being 
in this study: 
 You are not likely to benefit substantially from 
participating in this study. However, your participation 
will help us obtain information about how adults view 
privacy. In addition, we hope that others will benefit from 
what we find in this study. 
 If you would like to receive the results of this study, 
please make sure that we have your contact information. 
 
Compensation to You 
 
You will receive $10 per hour for each hour you spend in the study. 
The time to complete the study is approximately 2-2.5 hours, so you 




The following procedures will be followed to keep your 
personal information confidential in this study:  The data that 
are collected about you will be kept private to the extent 
allowed by law. To protect your privacy, your records will be 
kept under a code number rather than by name. Your records 
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will be kept in locked files and only study staff will be allowed 
to look at them. Your name and any other fact that might point 
to you will not appear when results of this study are presented 
or published. The audio recordings of the focus group will be 
transcribed and your name will not be included in the 
transcription. Audio files will be permanently deleted within 
approximately 2 weeks of transcription. 
 
Confidentiality cannot be guaranteed; your personal 
information may be disclosed if required by law. This means 
that there may be rare situations that require us to release 
personal information about you, for example, in case a judge 
requires such release in a lawsuit.  
 
To make sure that this research is being carried out in the 
proper way, the Georgia Institute of Technology IRB will 
review study records. The Office of Human Research 
Protections may also look at study records. 
 
Because each individual’s data are completely confidential, we 
cannot mail your individual results. We will mail the group 
results and a summary of the conclusions once the project is 
completed. 
 
In Case of Injury/Harm: 
 
Reports of injury or reaction should be made to: 
Dr. Wendy Rogers at (404) 894-6775 or  
Dr. Arthur Fisk at (404) 894-6066 
 
Neither the Georgia Institute of Technology nor the principal 
investigator has made provision for payment of costs 
associated with any injury resulting from participation in this 
study. 
 
Research Participant Rights 
 Your participation in this study is voluntary. You do not have to 
be in this study if you do not want to be. 
 You have the right to change your mind and leave the study at 
any time without giving any reason, and without penalty. 
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 Any new information that may make you change your mind 
about being in this study will be given to you. 
 You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 You do not waive any of your legal rights by signing this 
consent form. 
 
Questions about the Study or Your Rights as a Research 
Participant  
 
 If you have any questions about the study, you may contact 
the investigator at 404-385-0798 or 404-894-8344. 
 If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant, you may contact Ms. Melanie Clark, Georgia 
Institute of Technology at (404) 894-6942. 
 
 
If you sign below, it means that you have read (or have 
had read to you) the information given in this consent 





Participant Signature      
 Date 
 




If you must cancel a scheduled time to come to the lab, 
please call: (404) 894-8344. 
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APPENDIX B 
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Critical Incident Interview 
 
In this interview we are interested in learning about experiences you may have 
had with misclosures. A disclosure is when you intentionally reveal personal 
information to others. A misclosure, on the other hand, is when you 
unintentionally reveal information or make a disclosure error. 
 
In particular, in this interview, we are interested in misclosures that may have 
occurred while you were using technology.  
 
Examples of the type of technology we are interested in include cell phones, 
email, online banking, online healthcare, shopping online like Amazon, and social 
networking like Facebook and similar technologies.  
 
There are different types of misclosures. First, you may give unintended 
information to the person you intended to give it to. Second, you may give 
information you intended to give, but to a person you did not intend to give it to. 
Thirdly, you may give unintended information, and give it to a person you did not 
intend to give it to.      
 
For example, I could have speed dialed my mother on my phone and left a 
message, but accidentally speed dialed someone else. This constitutes the first 
kind of misclosure. 
 
As another example, I could have sent an email to my boss, but attached a family 
photo. I meant to attach a photo from a presentation I gave, but I attached the 
family reunion photo instead. This constitutes the second kind of misclosure, 
even though I sent it to the right person. However, it wouldn’t be a misclosure if 
you wrote an email and then forgot to attach an attachment because you did not 
disclose information that you did not intend to. 
 
We would also like for you to include any instances where these kinds of 
misclosures almost happened, but you caught yourself before the event actually 
occurred. 
 
We will begin by asking you to write down specific incidents in the past, and then 
ask questions about each incident specifically. 
 
We will not ask you to reveal any specific personal information, just what kind of 
information it was that you misclosed. What we want to know about is the 
circumstances surrounding the kinds of events that we will ask you about.  
 
Please remember that you are free to refuse to answer any of these questions 
without any penalty, and that you may stop participating in this interview at any 
time.  
 




Think about the (first, second, next…) example that you have written down.  
 
When did this happen? 
 




IF NO:  What was wrong with the information you sent?  
o ___Completely wrong 
o ___Inaccurate 
o ___Not current 
o ___Other: 
 




IF NO: Who did you mean to send it to? 
o ___Family member 






o ___Don’t Remember 
o ___Other: 
 
And who did you actually send it to? 
o ___Family member 






o ___Don’t Remember 
o ___Other: 
 
What kind of information were you trying to disclose?  (Something general like 
health or location is as far as you have to go to answer this question.) 
o ___Health 
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o ___Location/activity 
o ___Work related 
o ___Family related 
o ___Financial 
o ___Personal  
o ___Conversation 
o ___Request for information 
o ___Sex 
o ___First Name 
o ___Education Level 
o ___Age 
o ___Marital status 
o ___Interests/Hobbies 
o ___Product preferences 
o ___Race/Ethnicity 
o ___Occupation 
o ___Email address 
o ___Number of people in household 
o ___Political party affiliation 
o ___Recent online purchases 
o ___Last name 
o ___Religion 
o ___Postal address 
o ___Income 
o ___Telephone number 
o ___Draft of work project 
o ___Child’s name 
o ___Credit care number 
o ___Banking information 
o ___Social security number 
o ___Location 
o ___Don’t remember 
o ___Other: 
 
How private did you consider this information? 
o ___(5) Very private 
o ___(4) Private 
o ___(3) Neutral 
o ___(2) Not very private 
o ___(1) Not at all private  
 
 
How sensitive did you consider this information? 
o ___(5) Very sensitive 
o ___(4) Sensitive 
o ___(3) Neutral 
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o ___(2) Not very sensitive 
o ___(1) Not at all sensitive  
 
What kind of system were you using? 
o ___Cell phone  
o ___Email  
o ___Instant messaging  
o ___Text messaging  
o ___Online banking   
o ___Online health care  
o ___Online shopping  
o ___Online social network (facebook, etc.) 
o ___Online work/project management 
o ___Online school/project management 
 
How familiar were you with the system? 
o ___Very familiar 
o ___Familiar 
o ___Neither familiar nor unfamiliar 
o ___Not very familiar 
o ___Never used before (completely unfamiliar) 
 
How long had you been using this system? 
 






Were there any factors of this system that contributed to this mistake? 
o ___Single aspect of the system 
o ___Lack of familiarity 
o ___Hard to use 
o ___Auto-fill/predictive text features 
o ___Similar to other system, but different function 
 
Were there any things you did that contributed to this mistake? 
o ___Carelessness 
o ___Did not double check 
o ___Multitasking/concurrent activities 
o ___Lack of familiarity 
o ___Distracted by surroundings 
o ___Distracted (inside? By self/thoughts) 
o ___In a hurry 
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Where were you? 
o ___At home 
o ___At work 
o ___In the car 
o ___In public 
o ___On my way from [_________] to [_________] 
o ___Do not recall 
o ___Other: 
 






o ___Not specific 
o ___Do not recall 
o ___Multitasking general 
o ___Other: 
 
How much was the setting or environment around you distracting you when this 
misclosure happened? 
o ___Very distracting 
o ___Somewhat distracting 
o ___Neutral 
o ___Not very distracting 
o ___Not distracting at all 
o ___Don’t remember 
 
How urgent did you think that it was to perform the action you intended to 
perform? 
o ___Very Urgent 
o ___Urgent 
o ___Somewhat Urgent 
o ___Not very Urgent 
o ___Not Urgent 
o ___Don’t remember 
 
How quickly did you have to try and [insert task being discussed] at that time? 
o ___Very quickly 
o ___Somewhat quickly 
o ___Neutral 
o ___Not very quickly 
o ___Not at all 
 
Were there any negative consequences? 




What were they? 
 




How often has this happened? 
 
Have you taken any steps to make sure this doesn’t happen again? 
o ___No 
o ___Tried to be more careful 
o ___Always double check 
o ___Other: 
 





Other Misclosures (order counterbalanced) 
 
Recipient Misclosure 
I noticed you mainly told me about times when you disclosed the wrong 
information to the person that you intended to. Another kind of incident that we 
want to know about is when you give information you intended to give, but to a 
person you did not intend to give it to. 
 
Has anything like this ever happened to you? (repeat questions) 
 
Combination Misclosure  
Another kind of incident that we are looking for is when you give information that 
you didn’t intend to give, and you gave it to an unintended person. 
 




Can you think of any times when these kinds of mistakes almost happened but 
did not? 
 (Repeat questions) 
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Specific Questions (still drafting these – will be updated as we run pilots and get 
more examples) 
 
 Have you attached the wrong attachment (such as the wrong 





How often has this happened to you, etc. 
 
 Have you attached the wrong attachment (such as the wrong 





Have you ever sent an email to the wrong person? 
 
 Have you attached the wrong attachment (such as the wrong 





Have you ever replied to all when you meant to only reply to one person? 
 
 Have you attached the wrong attachment (such as the wrong 





Have you ever posted information on a social networking site that you meant for 
only some people to see, but others that you didn’t want to see were able to see? 
 Have you attached the wrong attachment (such as the wrong 





Have you ever sent a text message to the wrong person? 
 
 Have you attached the wrong attachment (such as the wrong 
photo) to an email? 
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Reminder Sheet for Participant 
 
 
To begin, please take 5 minutes to think about times when you’ve 
made disclosure errors in the past. 
 
Please list those below (for your own use) 
 
Remember: it is a misclosure if you disclose information and either: 
 You disclosed information you did not intend to disclose 
 You disclosed information you did intend to disclose, but to a 
person you did not intend the information for 
 You disclosed information you did not intend to disclose to a 
person you did not intend the information for. 
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Consent Form 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Protocol and Consent Title: Disclosure Errors (version 1, 2009) 
 
Investigators: Dr. Arthur D. Fisk, Dr. Wendy A. Rogers (Principal 




You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study. 
The purpose of this form is to tell you about the tasks you will 
be asked to complete today and to inform you about your 
rights as a research volunteer. Feel free to ask any questions 
that you may have about the study, what you will be asked to 
do, and so on. 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating in the study. The purpose 
of this research to determine the conditions surrounding mistakes 
people make in the disclosure of private information when using 
technology systems. With this information, we hope to be able to 
inform designers about common errors with privacy and technology.  
 
Exclusion/Inclusion Criteria:  
Participants in this study must be between the ages of 18 and 28 or 
65 and 80 and have used technology such as cell phones, email, or 
social networking in the past. 
  
Procedures: 
If you decide to participate in this study, your part will involve 
answering questions on questionnaires and responding to interview 
questions about any errors that may have occurred when you were 
using technology to disclose information. At the end of the session we 
will also ask you a few questions about your experience during the 
interview (an exit survey). We plan to record only the interview portion 
of this study using audio and/or videotape. 
 
It will probably take about an hour and a half to complete the entire 
study. You are welcome to take a break at any time during the study. 
 154   





The following risks/discomforts may occur as a result of your 
participation in this study. Participation in this study involves 
minimal risk or discomfort to you. Risks are minimal and do 
not exceed those of normal office work. Please tell us if you 




You are not likely to benefit in any way from joining this study. 
However, we hope that others will benefit from what we find in 
doing this study. 
 
Compensation to You: 
 
You will receive either $25 or 1.5 Experimetrix credits if you complete 
this study. If you do not complete the study and are receiving money 
you will receive $25. Instead of monetary compensation, Georgia 
Tech students will receive 1.0 Experimetrix credits for each hour of 
participation. If you withdraw from the study early for any reason, you 




The following procedures will be followed to keep your personal 
information confidential in this study:  All data that are collected about 
you will be kept private to the extent allowed by law. To protect your 
privacy, your records will be kept under a code number rather than by 
name. Your records will be kept in locked files and only study staff will 
be allowed to look at them. 
 
The interview portion of this study will be audio and/or video 
recorded. We may use these recordings in presentations and/or 
publications resulting from this study, however, your name will not be 
associated with the recording. 
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Please, select ONE of the following options for use of audio/video 
recordings by initialing your preference below. 
  
If you are willing to allow us to use a recording of any portion of 
your interview, please initial here _______. If you have initialed 
here, we may use a portion of your interview in a presentation, 
for example, but you will never be identified by name. 
 
If you would prefer that we use information from your 
audio/video recording only in transcribed form (rather 
than as an audio or video clip), please initial 
here________. 
 
Confidentiality cannot be guaranteed; your personal 
information may be disclosed if required by law. This means 
that there may be rare situations that require us to release 
personal information about you, for example, in case a judge 
requires such release in a lawsuit or if you tell us of your intent 
to harm yourself or others (including reporting behaviors 
consistent with child abuse). In addition, if you allow us to use 
a recording of your interview in a presentation it is possible 
that someone who sees the presentation may recognize you. 
If you prefer, we will only use information from your 
audio/video recording in transcribed form (rather than as an 
audio or video clip).  
 
To make sure that this research is being carried out in the proper 
way, the Georgia Institute of Technology IRB may review study 
records. The Office of Human Research Protections may also look 
over study records during required reviews. 
 
Because each individual’s data and test scores are completely 
confidential, we cannot mail your individual results.  
 
Costs to You:  
There are no costs to you, other than your time, associated 
with participating in this study. 
 
In Case of Injury/Harm: 
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If you are injured as a result of being in this study, please contact Dr. 
Arthur D. Fisk at 404-894-6066 or Dr. Wendy A. Rogers at 404-894-
6775. Neither the Georgia Institute of Technology nor the principle 
investigators have made provision for payment of costs associated 




 Your participation in this study is voluntary. You do not have to be 
in this study if you don't want to be. 
 You have the right to change your mind and leave the study at any 
time without giving any reason and without penalty. 
 Any new information that may make you change your mind about 
being in this study will be given to you. 
 You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 You do not waive any of your legal rights by signing this consent 
form. 
 
Questions about the Study or Your Rights as a Research 
Participant:  
 
 If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the 
investigator obtaining consent (listed below) at 404-385-0798. 
 If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant, you may contact Ms. Kelly Winn, Georgia Institute of 
Technology, Office of Research Compliance, at (404) 385- 2175. 
 
If you sign below, it means that you have read (or have had read to 
you) the information given in this consent form, and you would like to 
be a volunteer in this study. 
_________________________________________________ 
Participant Name (please print) 
 
 
Participant Signature      Date 
 
Name of Investigator Obtaining Consent (please print)  
 
Signature of Investigator Obtaining Consent Date 
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APPENDIX C 
MATERIALS USED FOR BOTH STUDIES 
Overview of Materials For Both Studies 
1. Privacy Attitudes Questionnaire 
2. Contact Form 
3. Demographics and Health Questionnaire 
4. Technology Experience Questionnaire 
Privacy Attitudes Questionnaire 
 
The purpose of this set of questions is to understand your privacy 
attitudes. Please answer the following eight questions by placing a 
check mark at the chosen response. 
 
 
1. Consumers have lost all control over how personal 
information is collected and used by companies. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 





2. Most businesses handle the personal information they collect 
about consumers in a proper and confidential way. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 




3. Existing laws and organizational practices provide a 
reasonable level of protection for consumer privacy today. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree Strongly  
Agree 




4. I am concerned about online identity theft. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 






5. I am concerned about my privacy online. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 





6. I am concerned about my privacy in everyday life. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 





7. I am likely to read the privacy policy of an ecommerce site 
before buying anything. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 





8. Privacy policies accurately reflect what companies do. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
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Education completed (check highest level) 
1  Less than high school graduate 
(highest grade completed? ________ ) 
2  High school graduate/G.E.D. 
3  Some college, or trade, technical, or business school 
(how many years? _________ ) 
4  Bachelor's degree 
5  Some graduate work (how many years? _____ ) 
6  Master's degree 
7  M.D., J.D., Ph.D., other advanced degree 
 
 
1. Current marital status (check one) 
1  Single 
2  Married 
3  Separated 
4  Divorced 
5  Widowed 




1  Black/African American 
2  Asian American/Pacific Islander 
3  White/Caucasian 
4  Hispanic/Latino 
5  American Indian/Alaskan Native 
6  Multiracial (please specify ____________ ) 
7  Other (please specify ________________ ) 
 
 
3. In which type of housing do you live? 
1  Residence hall/College dormitory 
2  House/Apartment/Condominium 
3  Senior housing (independent) 
4  Assisted living 
5  Nursing home 
6  Relative's home 
7  Other (please specify ________________ ) 
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4. Do you live alone a majority of the year? 
1  Yes 
2  No 
 
5. What is your primary language? 
1 English     
2 Spanish     
3 French     
4 Creole 
5 Portuguese    
6 Other  _________ 
 
6. Occupational status (check all that apply) 
1  Working full-time 
2  Working part-time 
3  Student 
4  Homemaker 
5  Retired  
6  Volunteer worker 
7  Seeking employment, laid off, etc. 
8  Leave of absence 
9  Other (please specify): 
 





8. What was your primary occupation? __________________________ 
 
10. What year did you retire?   __________________ 
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Gender: Male 1 Female 2    Date of Birth: __ __ / __ __ / __ __   Age: 
_______ 
 
9. What is your highest level of education? 
 
1  No formal education 
2  Less than high school graduate 
3  High school graduate/GED 
4  Vocational training 
5  Some college/Associate’s degree  
6  Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS) 
7  Master's degree (or other post-graduate training) 
8  Doctoral degree (PhD, MD, EdD, DDS, JD, etc.) 
 
10. Current marital status (check one) 
 
1  Single 
2  Married 
3  Separated 
4  Divorced 
5  Widowed 
6  Other (please specify) _________________  
 
11. Do you consider yourself Hispanic or Latino?  
 
1  Yes 
2  No 
 
Please answer the following questions. All of your answers will be treated confidentially. Any published 
document regarding these answers will not identify individuals with their answers. If there is a question 
you do not wish to answer, please just leave it blank and go on to the next question. Thank you in 
advance for your help. 
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3 a.   If “Yes”, would you describe yourself:  
 
1 Cuban     
2 Mexican    
3 Puerto Rican 
4 Other (please specify) ________________  
 
 
12. How would you describe your primary racial group?  
 
1 No Primary Group             
2 White Caucasian  
3 Black/African American 
4 Asian 
5 American Indian/Alaska Native  
6 Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
7 Multi-racial 
8 Other (please specify) ______________________  
 
 
13. In which type of housing do you live? 
 
1  Residence hall/College dormitory 
2  House/Apartment/Condominium 
3  Senior housing (independent) 
4  Assisted living 
5  Nursing home 
6  Relative's home 
7  Other (please specify) ________________  
 
 
14. Which category best describes your yearly household income. Do not give the 
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15. Is English your primary language? 
 
1  Yes 
2  No 
 
7 a. If “No”, What is your primary language?  _____________________  
 
 
8. What is your primary mode of transportation? (Check one) 
 
1  Drive my own vehicle 
2  A friend or family member takes me to places I need to go 
3  Transportation service provided by where I live 






9. What is your primary occupational status? (Check one) 
 
1  Work full-time 
2  Work part-time 
3  Student 
4  Homemaker 
5  Retired  
6  Volunteer worker 
7  Seeking employment, laid off, etc. 
8  Other (please specify) _______________________________________ 
 
10.   Do you currently work for pay? 
 
1  Yes, Full-time 
2  Yes, Part-time 
 3  No 
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11.  What was your primary occupation? __________________________ 
 
 
12.  What year did you retire?   _____________________ 
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Health Information 
 
1. In general, would you say your health is: 
  
     1   2    3          4         5 
 Poor           Fair          Good         Very good        
Excellent 
 
2. Compared to other people your own age, would you say your health is: 
  
    1   2    3          4         5 
 Poor           Fair          Good         Very good        
Excellent 
  
3. How satisfied are you with your present health? 
 
   1        2      3            4      5 
    Not at all       Not very     Neither satisfied    Somewhat  Extremely 
     satisfied        satisfied       nor dissatisfied    satisfied   satisfied 
 
4. How often do health problems stand in the way of your doing the things you want 
to do? 
 
  1   2     3         4      5 
Never        Seldom         Sometimes               Often   Always 
 
6. The following items are about activities you might do during a typical day. Does 











Not limited  
at all 
a. Bathing or dressing yourself 
b. Bending, kneeling, or stooping 
c. Climbing one flight of stairs 
d. Climbing several flights of stairs 
e. Lifting or carrying groceries 
 166   
f. Moderate activities, such as moving a table,  
pushing a vacuum cleaner, bowling, or playing golf 
g. Vigorous activities, such as running, lifting heavy
objects, or participating in strenuous sports (e.g., 
swimming laps) 
h. Walking more than a mile 
i. Walking one block 
j. Walking several blocks 
 
 
6.   Are you on post-menopausal estrogen replacement therapy? 
 




7. For each of the following conditions please indicate if you have ever had that  
condition in your life, have the condition now at this time or never had the 
condition.  
Check one box for each condition.  
 
I...1.1.1 Condition 
In your lifetime1 Now2 Never3 
a. Arthritis  
b. Asthma or Bronchitis  
c. Cancer (other than skin cancer)  
d. Diabetes  
e. Epilepsy  
f. Heart Disease  
g. Hearing Impairment  
h. Hypertension  
i. Stroke  
j. Vision Impairment  
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Medication Usage Details 
Please list all medical products that you are currently taking. Include medicinal 
herbs, vitamins, aspirin, antacid, nasal spray, laxatives, etc., as well as 
prescription medications (copy names from label if possible). This information will 
be completely confidential. 
 
EXAMPLE 
Name of Medication:  Zarontin 
Reason for taking:____epilepsy___ Dosage (ea. time taken): 500 mg  
How often do you take the medication? (circle one)   
                        daily      every other day      weekly      as needed 
On days that you take the medication, how many times per day do you take it?  
What time of day do you take the medication? morning, afternoon, evening 
How long you have been taking the medication?                   5 years     
Does this medication cause any problems?  makes me sleepy 
 
1. Name of Medication: _____________________________________________ 
Reason for taking:_____________________  Dosage (ea. time taken):________ 
How often do you take the medication? (circle one)   
                        daily      every other day      weekly      as needed 
On days that you take the medication, how many times per day do you take it?  
What time of day do you take the medication?  
How long you have been taking medication? ___________________________ 
Does this medication cause any problems?   
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TECHNOLOGY AND COMPUTER EXPERIENCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
The purpose of this set of questions is to assess your familiarity and experience 




1. How often do you communicate with other people (e.g., family members, 













 Not sure 
what it 
is1









1. Answering machine       
2. Cell phone       
3. Fax machine        
4. Internet (e.g.,       
e-mail, chat room, 
videoconferencing) 
      
5. Telephone        








3. How often do you go shopping? 
 








4. Within the last year, which of the following have you used for shopping? 
 
 Not sure 
what it 
is1 







1. Credit card       
2. Debit card       
3. In-store 
automated   kiosk 
(e.g., self-checkout, 
price scanner, item 
locator)  
      




      
5. Telephone        
6. Television 
shopping 
      
 
 
5. How often do you use customer service functions (e.g., technical support, 
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6. Within the last year, which of the following have you used for customer service 
(e.g., technical support, product assistance, reservations)? 
 
 
 Not sure 
what it 
is1 










      
2. CD/DVD       
3. E-mail        
4. Fax machine       
5. Internet (e.g., 
on-line manuals, 
on-line interactive 
support, web site) 
      
6. Person on the 
telephone 
      
 
7. How often do you make financial transactions (e.g., bill paying, banking, 
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8. Within the last year, which of the following have you used for financial 
transactions (e.g., bill paying, banking, investing/financial planning, tax 
preparation)? 
 
 Not sure 
what it 
is1 












      
2. Automatic teller 
machine (ATM) 
      
3. Drive-through 
banking 
      
4. Internet (e.g., 
on-line banking, 
on-line bill paying, 
on-line investing) 
      
5. Person on the 
telephone 
      




      
 
9. How often do you engage in healthcare related activities for yourself or others 
(e.g., going to see a doctor, checking blood pressure, finding information about a 
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10. Within the last year, which of the following have you used for healthcare related 
activities for yourself or others? 
 
 Not sure 
what it 
is1











      
2. Health information 
searching on the 
Internet  





      
4. Medical-related 
Internet purchasing 
(e.g., medication or 
medical supplies) 
      
5. Person on the 
telephone 
      
6. Telemedicine (e.g., 
videoconferencing 
with doctors or 
nurses) 
      
 
11. How often do you use healthcare devices at home for yourself or others (e.g., 
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12. Within the last year, which of the following healthcare devices have you used in 
your home? 
 Not sure 
what it 
is1








1. Blood pressure 
measurement device 
      
2. Digital 
thermometer 
      





      
4. Emergency call 
system (e.g., 
Lifeline) 
      
5. Heating pads       
6. Infusion pump       
7. Monitoring device 
(e.g., glucose, 
apnea, cardiac) 
      
8. Nebulizers       
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16. Within the last year, which of the following transportation-related systems have 
you            used? 
 
 Not sure 
what it 
is1









1. Automated telephone 
menu system 
      
2. Automatic check-in 
station  
      
3. Automatic parking 
payment station 
      
4. Automatic ticket 
purchase station 
      
4. Cruise control in your car       
5. In-car navigation system 
(e.g., GPS, OnStar, 
Neverlost) 
      
6. On-line travel schedule       
7. Personal digital assistant 
(PDA) 
      
8. Person on the phone       
9. Remote control to start 
the car 
      
10. Travel direction/ map 
software (e.g., MapQuest, 
Streets & Trips, Keyhole) 
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18. Within the last year, which of the following leisure/hobby/entertainment-related 
systems have you used? 
 Not sure 
what it 
is1









1. Books on tape 
(audio book) 







      
3. Digital photography 
(e.g., camera, 
camcorder) 
      
4. Fitness device 
(e.g., pedometer, 
pulse meter, golf 
swing enhancer, 
treadmill) 







      
6. MP3/IPOD       
7. Personal digital 
assistant (PDA) 
      
8. Recording and 
playback device 
(e.g., CD, DVD, 
VCR) 
      
9. TV set-top box 
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20. Within the last year, which of the following learning/educational/self-help-related 
systems have you used? 
 
 Not sure 
what it 
is1 










CD, DVD, VCR) 
      
2. Computer 
support group 
(e.g., chat room, 
discussion forum) 
      
3. Digital or tape 
recorder  











      
6. Online library 
database/catalog 
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21. On average, how many hours per day do you spend at home? 
 
1 Less than 8 hours 
2 8-11 hours 
3 12-15 hours 
4 16-19 hours 
5 20-24 hours 
 













1. Garage door 
opener  
      
2. Microwave oven       







      
4. Personal 
computer 










      
6. Robot (e.g., 
vacuum cleaner, 
lawn mower) 
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23. On average, how many hours per week do you work (including volunteer work) 
in or out of the home? (For the purpose of this question you should not consider 
activities such as homemaking or family caregiving) 
1 0  
2 1 – 10 hours 
3 11 – 20 hours 
4 21 – 30 hours 
5 31 – 40 hours 
6 More than 40 hours  
 
24. Within the last year, which of the following technologies have you used in the 













1. Bar code scanner       
2. Cell phone       
3. Computer       
4. Copier/scanner       
5. Recording or 
playback device 
(e.g., CD, DVD, 
VCR) 
      
6. Electronic cash 
register (point of 
sale terminal) 
      
7. E-mail       
8. Fax machine       
9. Internet       







      
12. Pager/Beeper       
13. Personal digital 
assistant (PDA) 
      
14. Voice recorder 
(e.g., dictaphone, 
digital recording 
      

















25. For each of activities listed in the table, please indicate how important 
technology is to the performance of the activity. 
 








     
2. Customer service 
activities 
     
3. Financial transaction 
activities 
     
4. Healthcare related 
activities for 
yourself or others 
     
5. Home activities      
6. Learning/education/ 
self-help activities 




     
8. Shopping activities      
9. Transportation 
activities 
     
10. Use of healthcare   
devices in your 
home 
     
11. Work activities      
 
 
26. How much more training would you like to have in the use of technology? 
1 None  
2 A little 
3 Moderate training 
4 A lot 
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27. Have you had experience with computers? 
1 Yes  
2 No (Skip the rest of the questionnaire)
  
28. For each input device listed below, please indicate how much experience you 
have had with the device in the past year. 
 











1. Joystick      
2. Keyboard      
3. Light-pen      
4. Mouse      




     
7. Touch screen with 
finger 
     
8. Touch screen with 
stylus 
     
9. Trackball      
 
29. For each basic computer operation listed below, please indicate how much 
experience you have had with the operation in the past year. 
 











1. Delete a file      
2. Insert a  
disk/CD/DVD 
     
3. Install software      
4. Open a file      
5. Save a file      
6. Set printer options      
7. Set monitor 
options 
     
8. Transfer files      
9. Use a printer      
10. Use cut-and-
paste 
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30. For each item listed below, please indicate how much experience you have had 















1. Apple (Macintosh) 
operating system 
     
2. CD/DVD creation 
software 
     




     
4. Conferencing software      
5. Database management 
(e.g., Access, 
Filemaker, Lotus 123) 
     
6. E-mail      
7. Home computer 
network (e.g., wire or 
wireless) 
     
8. Instant messaging      
9. Internet phone      
10. Presentation software 
(e.g., PowerPoint, 
Freelance) 
     
11. Programming package 
(e.g., Basic, C++, 
Fortran, Java) 
     
12. Spreadsheet (e.g., 
Excel, Quattro Pro) 
     
13. Statistical package 
(e.g., SPSS, SAS) 
     
14. UNIX/LINUX operating 
system 
     
15. Web design software 
(e.g., Java, HTML) 
     
16. Windows operating 
system 
     
17. Word processing (e.g., 
Microsoft Word, 
WordPerfect) 
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31. For each windows operation listed below, please indicate how much 
experience you have had with the operation in the past year.  
 
 











1. Change audio 
settings 
     
2. Change screen 
settings 
     
3. Change network 
settings 
     
4. Click icon      
5. Close a window      
6. Empty trash      
7. Manage multiple 
windows 
     
8. Move between 
windows 
     
9. Open a window      
10. Perform 
operations using right 
click on mouse 
     
11. Resize a window      
12. Scroll horizontally      
13. Scroll vertically      
14. Search for files      
15. Update the clock      
16. Use drop-down 
menu 
     
17. Use windows help 
system 
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Internet Questionnaire 
 
The purpose of this set of questions is to assess your familiarity and experience with the Internet. Please 
answer all questions by placing a check mark on or filling in the appropriate response. 
 
1. About how many hours a week do you use the Internet? 
 
1   Never (Skip the rest of the questionnaire) 
2   Less than one hour a week 
3   Between 1 hour and 5 hours a week 
4   Between 6 hours and 10 hours a week 
5   Between 11 hours and 15 hours a week 
6   More 15 hours a week 
 
2.  How long have you been using the Internet? 
 
1   Less than 6 months 
2   Between 6 months and 1 year 
3   More than 1 year, but less than 3 years 
4   More than 3 years, but less than 5 years 
5   More than 5 years 
 
3. Compared to a year ago, has your use of the Internet changed? 
 
1 No change  
2 Increase in use 
3 Decrease in use 
 
4. If your use has changed, please explain why in a few words (e.g., training, 
equipment problems, frustration) 
       __________________________________________________________ 
        
5. What was the primary method that you used to learn to use the Internet? 
 
1   I taught myself by exploring it on my own 
2   I read books on how to use the Internet 
3   I attended a class  
4   I learned from a friend or family member 
5   I used an online tutorial 
6   I used a CD or videotape 
7   Other ways (please specify below): _______________________ 
8    ------  None of the Above  -------- 
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6.  Please specify the frequency with which you have performed each of 










management (e.g., pay 
bills online, buy or sell 
stocks) 
    
2. Communication (e.g., e-
mail, instant messaging) 
    
3. Community information 
(e.g., find information 
about community events 
or religious services) 
    
4. Education (e.g., 
participate in on-line 
degree or training 
program, search for 
information about 




    
5. Employment (e.g., post 
resume or search for 
information about 
employment) 
    
6. Entertainment (e.g., 
purchase tickets for 
cultural or entertainment 
events, find information 
about TV or radio shows, 
cultural or entertainment 
events, or information 
related to hobbies) 
    
7. Government and official 
issues (e.g., access a 
government website to 
download standard forms 
or find out information 
about benefits and 
programs) 
    
8. Health information (e.g., 
find information about an 
    









illness or order medication 
or health product) 
9. News information (e.g., 
find information about the 
weather, read the 
newspaper) 
    
10. Shopping (e.g., purchase 
clothes, search for 
information about a 
product) 
    
11. Travel (e.g., make 
airline, train, hotel, or 
rental car reservations, 
search for maps, travel 
information) 
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APPENDIX D 
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